EU-MERCOSUR: STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES AND PRACTICALIMPLICATIONS FOR ITALIAN BUSINESSESKey takeaways from the DG TRADE Italian Edition discussion – 26 May 2026

INDEX

Executive Summary Market Access, Competitiveness and Regulatory Simplification Sector-Specific Implications and Strategic Considerations for Italy Conclusions

Executive Summary

The DG TRADE Italian Edition discussion on 26 May 2026 provided a practical overview of what the EU-Mercosur Agreement could mean for Italian businesses, placing the debate within a broader geopolitical and commercial context. The discussion made clear that the agreement is being framed not only as a trade instrument, but also as a strategic response to Europe’s declining competitive position in parts of Latin America, particularly in comparison with China’s growing economic footprint in the region.

A central message from the speakers was that the agreement would create opportunities for European exporters by reducing both tariffs and administrative barriers, while preserving EU regulatory standards. For Italian businesses, this could translate into stronger market access, improved protection for geographical indications, and a more predictable commercial environment in sectors where Italy has established strengths. At the same time, concerns around sensitive agricultural imports were directly addressed, with assurances that EU food safety requirements and market safeguard mechanisms remain fully in place.

Market Access, Competitiveness and Regulatory Simplification

Much of the discussion focused on the practical implications of the agreement for European companies seeking to expand in Mercosur markets. Speakers emphasized that the commercial value of the agreement goes well beyond tariff reductions. A major advantage lies in the reduction of non-tariff barriers that often make exporting costly and slow, including duplicative technical checks, burdensome certification procedures, and import authorization processes that create uncertainty for businesses.

The agreement was also presented as a strategic tool to strengthen Europe’s competitive position in Latin America at a time when Chinese firms have become increasingly embedded in the region. According to the speakers, European businesses currently face a structural disadvantage in markets such as Brazil and Argentina, where China has consolidated its presence while European market share has weakened. Because China does not currently benefit from an equivalent trade arrangement with Mercosur, the agreement could improve the relative position of European exporters, particularly in sectors such as automotive manufacturing, fashion, wine, and industrial goods where Italian companies are especially active.

Sector-Specific Implications and Strategic Considerations for Italy

A more technical part of the discussion focused on rules of origin, which will determine whether products qualify for preferential tariff treatment. Speakers acknowledged that these requirements can be complex and differ significantly depending on the sector, especially where supply chains rely on components sourced globally. This means that businesses will need to assess carefully whether their products can effectively benefit from the agreement in practice.For Italy, the agreement was presented as especially relevant for industries that rely on quality, brand value, and product authenticity. The protection of geographical indications was highlighted as a concrete gain, with products such as Parmigiano Reggiano expected to benefit from stronger recognition and protection in Mercosur markets. Agricultural sensitivities were also openly discussed, particularly concerning beef imports, with the Commission underlining that monitoring tools and safeguard measures are intended to mitigate risks for vulnerable European sectors. The discussion also briefly addressed Mercosur’s evolving political composition, including Bolivia’s prospective accession and Venezuela’s continued suspension, both of which may shape future developments.

Conclusions

The discussion framed the EU-Mercosur Agreement as a strategic attempt to combine economic opportunity with geopolitical positioning, offering new openings for European businesses while seeking to preserve the regulatory safeguards and market protections that remain central to the EU’s trade approach:

The EU-Mercosur Agreement is being positioned as both a commercial opportunity and a strategic instrument to strengthen Europe’s presence in Latin America.

For Italian businesses, the most immediate potential benefits lie in improved market access, reduced administrative barriers, and stronger protection for high-value branded products.

Real commercial gains will depend on companies’ ability to navigate technical implementation issues, particularly rules of origin and product-specific compliance requirements.

While sensitivities remain in agriculture, the Commission’s message was that regulatory protections and monitoring mechanisms are designed to ensure that market opening does not come at the expense of EU standards or vulnerable sectors.

20th EU Sanctions Package against Russia and Belarus Overview

On 23 April 2026 the European Union adopted its 20th package of sanctions against Russia and, in parallel, strengthened the restrictive measures regime applicable to Belarus. More than the breadth of the measures, the package’s political and operational message is striking: the EU intends to move decisively from a logic of incremental prohibitions to a phase of intensified enforcement and closure of circumvention routes. The objective is not merely to widen the scope of restrictions but to make evasion more difficult and costly by targeting the infrastructures, intermediary networks and financial channels that have recently sustained commercial and logistical flows to Russia.

Energy, Maritime and Tanker Measures

The approach is evident from the initial measures in the energy and maritime sectors. The package introduces new listings affecting the Russian energy industry across the entire value chain, from exploration and production to refining and transport, with the aim of reducing capacity and revenues over the medium to long term. A qualitative shift is the heightened pressure on the shadow fleet ecosystem. The measures target not only vessels but a broader set of actors involved in oil and energy exports including third‑country operators, marine insurers and logistics providers, resulting in an aggregate number of 632 sanctioned vessels subject to port access bans and service prohibitions. The inclusion of a mechanism to delist units when conduct returns to compliance signals that the list is intended to be dynamic, incentivising compliance and increasing the importance of evidentiary quality and traceability of operators’ conduct.

In the same vein, the package addresses the sale of tankers by EU operators. From 24 April 2026 specific safeguards apply including enhanced due diligence and a mandatory contractual “no Russia” clause to reduce the risk that vessels sold by EU parties will, directly or indirectly, support Russian energy exports. This development shifts part of the sanctions compliance burden onto contractual arrangements: it is no longer sufficient to know the immediate buyer; sellers must demonstrate that transactions were structured with precautions adequate to prevent prohibited uses and must provide remedies, verification and response mechanisms in the event of diversion.

Financial, Crypto and Trade Measures

The financial measures reflect the same philosophy. The EU expands the prohibition on dealings with an additional group of Russian banks, bringing the total number of institutions excluded from the EU internal market to 70, subject to limited exceptions. The principal innovation is the focus on intermediaries in third countries. The package extends transaction bans to banks located in jurisdictions such as Kyrgyzstan, Laos and Azerbaijan that are considered to have facilitated the war effort or enabled evasive conduct, including through links to the Russian financial messaging system SPFS. For EU operators this means that the risk is no longer confined to Russia; it now extends to payment chains, transit banks and architectures that permit value to reach prohibited destinations via intermediate steps.

Measures on crypto assets and digital services further complicate the compliance landscape. From 24 May 2026 a sectoral ban will apply to transactions with Russian crypto asset service providers and decentralised platforms used to circumvent sanctions. Restrictions also target instruments deemed enabling of circumvention such as certain rouble‑linked crypto solutions and digital currency initiatives and extend to intermediaries facilitating international payments on behalf of Russia. Businesses must therefore recognise that sanctions compliance and AML/fintech controls are converging, requiring more robust procedures for wallets, platforms, service providers and settlement methods.

On the trade and industrial front the package applies a pincer strategy. It introduces new export prohibitions to Russia covering high‑value goods and product categories that may directly or indirectly support industrial and military capabilities. It also imposes new import bans on metals, chemicals and minerals and introduces a quota on ammonia to limit supply levels. The scope of prohibited services is expanded to include a specific ban on the provision of cybersecurity services to Russian entities and restrictions on managed security services. This evolution directly affects ICT operators, managed service providers and digital service companies delivering cross‑border services: the destination of the service and the nature of the counterparty become decisive factors even where no physical goods are transferred.

Anti‑Circumvention and Enforcement

At the core of the package is the anti‑circumvention component. For the first time the EU activates the anti‑evasion mechanism, citing the Kyrgyzstan case and the continued re‑export to Russia of EU‑origin goods including machine tools and telecommunications equipment identified as usable in the production of drones and missiles. The message is unequivocal: the EU is prepared to intervene more directly in the geographic and commercial corridors of circumvention and to expand the lists of entities deemed facilitators. This framework also encompasses an extension of the list of goods prohibited from transiting Russian territory and an expansion of the broadcasting ban to entities that replicate content of already sanctioned actors.

Legal Protection for EU Operators and Belarus Measures

Alongside strengthened prohibitions, the package introduces measures often overlooked in public debate but crucial for market participants: legal protection for EU operators. The EU aims to shield European businesses and citizens from retaliatory measures and abusive litigation by providing tools to respond to aggressive judicial initiatives and to seek compensation where wrongful decisions are enforced in third countries. The package targets beneficiaries of so‑called temporary management described as de facto expropriation of EU operators and includes restrictions related to the misappropriation of intellectual property of European companies in Russia. It also contains significant limitations affecting research and innovation including a prohibition on accepting funding, donations or grants from the Russian government and a narrowly tailored provision permitting, under specified conditions, the use of frozen funds to cover arbitration costs subject to strict requirements regarding the recipient and the absence of sanctioned links.

With respect to Belarus the package confirms progressive alignment with the Russia regime. New listings and restrictions largely mirror the sectoral measures applied to Moscow including limitations on crypto and services and extend the regime’s duration until 28 February 2027. Notably, the inclusion of a Chinese state‑owned company in the Belarus regime underscores the EU’s willingness to target military supply chains even when they lie outside the traditional geographic perimeter.

Conclusion and Practical Implications

The 20th package signals an evolution: EU sanctions are no longer merely a set of sectoral prohibitions and listings but an increasingly integrated system aimed at disrupting the networks that enable circumvention including logistical, financial and digital channels while providing protective instruments for those in Europe subject to pressure or retaliation. For businesses the implication is clear: compliance must become more defensible, meaning documented, contractualised and capable of withstanding ex post scrutiny. It is no longer sufficient to verify the immediate counterparty; operators must understand the transaction as a whole including routes, intermediaries, payment channels, ultimate beneficiaries, ownership chains and actual destinations.

Our Assistance

GA Alliance regularly assists European and international operators with the adaptation of sanctions and export control programmes, the review of contractual documentation including insertion of anti‑circumvention clauses and audit mechanisms, and the management of litigation risk and asset protection and arbitration issues arising from restrictive measures.

Lo scorso venerdì, a Roma, si è svolto un incontro di particolare rilievo per il settore sportivo e per la comunità giuridica: il convegno “La Giustizia nello Sport”, dedicato all’analisi dell’attuale sistema italiano e alle prospettive di riforma alla luce del diritto dell’Unione Europea. L’appuntamento ha riunito professionisti, studiosi e rappresentanti delle istituzioni sportive in un momento in cui il rapporto tra autonomia dell’ordinamento sportivo e vincoli sovranazionali è al centro di un confronto sempre più serrato.

Nel corso dell’evento è stata presentata la Nota redatta da GA‑Alliance, un documento che ricostruisce con rigore sistematico il quadro normativo, le criticità strutturali e gli scenari che potrebbero aprirsi con la decisione della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea nel caso Agnelli‑Arrivabene, attesa nel primo semestre del 2026.

Un settore sempre più integrato nel mercato europeo

La Nota sottolinea come l’industria dello sport abbia ormai assunto una dimensione economica tale da non poter essere considerata un ambito separato dal diritto comune. La giurisprudenza europea, dalla sentenza Bosman alla più recente European Superleague, ha chiarito che le attività sportive professionistiche rientrano nel campo di applicazione del diritto dell’Unione ogniqualvolta assumano natura economica. L’art. 165 TFUE, che richiama la “specificità dello sport”, non crea zone franche, ma impone un’applicazione delle norme europee che tenga conto delle peculiarità del fenomeno senza derogare ai principi fondamentali, dalle libertà di circolazione alle regole di concorrenza.

In questo contesto, l’Italia si trova a gestire un calendario di eventi sportivi internazionali di portata eccezionale, che richiedono stabilità regolatoria, certezza del diritto e piena conformità agli standard europei. La recente introduzione del valore costituzionale dello sport nell’art. 33 Cost. rende ancora più stringente l’esigenza di un sistema di giustizia sportiva coerente con i principi dell’ordinamento interno ed europeo.

Le criticità del modello italiano

La struttura attuale della giustizia sportiva italiana, delineata dal decreto‑legge n. 220/2003 e dalla legge n. 280/2003, si fonda su una netta separazione tra ordinamento sportivo e giurisdizione statale. Tuttavia, l’interpretazione giurisprudenziale consolidata ha prodotto un risultato che oggi appare difficilmente compatibile con il diritto dell’Unione: il giudice amministrativo non può annullare né sospendere in via cautelare le sanzioni disciplinari sportive, potendo intervenire solo attraverso la tutela risarcitoria.

La Nota ricostruisce il percorso che ha condotto a questo assetto, dalle pronunce della Corte Costituzionale del 2011 e del 2019 fino alle più recenti applicazioni. Il sistema, pur ritenuto costituzionalmente legittimo, presenta evidenti limiti rispetto ai requisiti europei di effettività della tutela giurisdizionale, indipendenza degli organi giudicanti e garanzie procedurali. Il deficit di terzietà degli organi endofederali, la mancanza di criteri uniformi di proporzionalità delle sanzioni e l’estensione automatica delle misure disciplinari in ambito UEFA e FIFA amplificano ulteriormente le criticità.

Il caso Agnelli‑Arrivabene e il rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia UE

Il convegno ha dedicato ampio spazio al caso che oggi rappresenta il punto di snodo del dibattito: il rinvio pregiudiziale sollevato dal TAR Lazio nel procedimento promosso da Andrea Agnelli e Maurizio Arrivabene. La vicenda, originata dal procedimento FIGC sulle plusvalenze, ha posto in discussione non solo la proporzionalità delle sanzioni irrogate, ma l’intero impianto della legge n. 280/2003.

Le tre questioni sottoposte alla Corte di Giustizia riguardano la compatibilità del sistema italiano con l’art. 47 della Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali, la conformità delle sanzioni alle libertà di circolazione e la relazione tra autonomia sportiva e norme antitrust. Le Conclusioni dell’Avvocato Generale Dean Spielmann, depositate il 18 dicembre 2025, hanno riconosciuto che un divieto biennale di operare nel calcio professionistico può essere compatibile con il diritto europeo solo se giustificato da obiettivi legittimi e proporzionato. Hanno però affermato con chiarezza che il diritto dell’Unione osta a una normativa che impedisca al giudice nazionale di annullare una sanzione disciplinare illegittima.

Secondo l’Avvocato Generale, se il TAR Lazio è l’unico organo dotato dei requisiti di indipendenza richiesti dall’art. 47 della Carta, esso deve poter esercitare un sindacato pieno, comprensivo del potere di annullamento e di sospensione cautelare. La verifica di tale presupposto è rimessa allo stesso TAR, ma la Nota osserva come difficilmente gli organi di giustizia sportiva possano essere qualificati come “giurisdizioni” europee, essendo i loro componenti nominati dalle stesse federazioni soggette al loro giudizio.

Verso una riforma necessaria

La decisione della Corte di Giustizia potrebbe determinare l’incompatibilità della legge n. 280/2003 con il diritto dell’Unione, imponendo al giudice amministrativo di disapplicare la normativa interna e di esercitare un controllo pieno sulle sanzioni disciplinari. Le conseguenze sarebbero rilevanti sia per i singoli procedimenti, come quello che coinvolge Agnelli e Arrivabene, sia per l’assetto complessivo della giustizia sportiva italiana.

Il Governo ha già avviato un tavolo di lavoro con CONI e CIP per una riforma organica del sistema. La Nota evidenzia come tale riforma non possa limitarsi a riconoscere al TAR Lazio poteri più ampi, ma debba necessariamente intervenire sulla struttura interna delle federazioni, riducendo i gradi di giudizio, rafforzando l’indipendenza degli organi e codificando garanzie procedurali minime uniformi. Solo un intervento complessivo potrà assicurare un equilibrio tra autonomia sportiva, effettività della tutela giurisdizionale e conformità ai principi europei.

Sport Desk Legal & Tax di GA‑Alliance

GA‑Alliance ha costituito il primo team integrato Legal & Tax dedicato allo Sport con coverage nazionale e internazionale, guidato dal professor Enrico Lubrano ed Ezio Simonelli. Lo Sport Desk riunisce competenze di eccellenza nel diritto sportivo, amministrativo e fiscale, grazie a una squadra multidisciplinare composta, in Italia, dal Prof. Lubrano, dal Dott. Simonelli (presidente della Lega Calcio di Serie A), dai partner Cristiano Cerchiai (presidente della Federazione Italiana Golf), Laura Bellicini (già membro del collegio sindacale FIG), e dal Counsel Vincenzo Volpe (Procura Federale FIGC). A livello internazionale, il Desk si avvale dell’esperienza dei partner Bahaa Alieldean (Egitto), Joao Valadas Coriel (Portogallo), Stevan Dimitrijević (Bosnia‑Herzegovina) e Panagiotis Drakopoulos (Grecia & Cipro), garantendo una piattaforma transfrontaliera coordinata e unica nel mercato.

La Practice globale “Sport Legal & Tax” offre assistenza completa lungo l’intero ciclo di vita dell’attività sportiva: diritto sportivo, regolamentazione e disciplina nazionale e internazionale, sponsorizzazioni, licensing, accordi commerciali, diritti media e digitali, nonché supporto su progetti infrastrutturali e sviluppo di stadi tramite modelli di partenariato pubblico‑privato. Il Desk segue inoltre la strutturazione fiscale e la pianificazione cross‑border per club, atleti e investitori, e gestisce contenziosi sportivi e arbitrati, assicurando sempre la massima compliance ai parametri di sostenibilità finanziaria e vigilanza regolamentare. Una piattaforma integrata pensata per accompagnare l’evoluzione dell’industria dello sport in Italia e all’estero.

Scarica la Nota completa

Per approfondire nel dettaglio il quadro normativo, le questioni pregiudiziali e le prospettive di riforma, è possibile scaricare la Nota integrale redatta da GA‑Alliance.Il documento offre un’analisi completa e aggiornata, utile per professionisti, operatori del settore e studiosi interessati all’evoluzione della giustizia sportiva italiana nel contesto europeo.

Scarica la Nota completa

NOTA_Giustizia_Sportiva_17.04.2026 GA-Alliance Sport DeskDownload

Governance, Resilience, and Market Access

INDEX

Executive summary Regulatory standstill and outlook Strategic imperatives and the evolution of digital governance Next Steps Conclusion

Download the Client Alert!

Executive summary 

On 20 January 2026, the European Commission presented a comprehensive “Cybersecurity Package”, proposing a targeted revision of the “EU Cybersecurity Act” (originally adopted as Regulation (EU) n. 2019/881) alongside amendments to Directive (EU) n. 2022/2555 (“NIS2 Directive”).

The original 2019 framework established a permanent mandate on the “European Union Agency for Cybersecurity” (“ENISA”) as the Union’s central technical authority and introduced the “EU Common Criteria-based” (“EUCC”)scheme, laying the foundations of the European cybersecurity certification system. 

Since then, the overall set of existing and emerging threats, has evolved considerably. Modern attacks frequently disrupt vital operations and industrial networks, revealing structural flaws in cross-border coordination. 

The 2026 proposal arrives at a critical juncture where cyberattacks no longer target data alone, but increasingly jeopardise critical infrastructure, essential services, as well as global supply chains. These vulnerabilities are compounded by hybrid threats and growing geopolitical dependencies on foreign technologies. 

Consequently, the proposal moves beyond mere technical standards to address systemic bottlenecks, aiming by reinforcing ENISA’s mandate and restructuring the certification architecture to ensure greater uniformity across the internal market. Additionally, it establishes a formal mechanism to manage risks within ICT supply chains, including the identification of high-risk providers and the implementation of safeguards in high-priority sectors.

For businesses, cybersecurity is no longer confined to regulatory compliance. It directly affects market access, contractual stability, investment planning, and long-term competitiveness within the European digital economy. 

The proposal will now follow the ordinary legislative procedure before the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, then entering a phase of interinstitutional negotiation and technical refinement. If adopted, it is likely to redefine both regulatory obligations and competitive dynamics within the European digital market.

Regulatory standstill and outlook 

The proposed reform initiative marks a shift from a predominantly technical compliance regime toward an integrated governance model anchored in institutional consolidation. At its core lies the strengthening of ENISA as the Union’s central technical authority.

By formalising the Agency’s role in drafting candidate schemes and providing structured technical support to national authorities, the European Commission seeks to eliminate the fragmented national practices that have historically undermined mutual recognition across the EU. This approach ensures a uniform interpretation of assurance levels (ranging from “basic” to “high”) while harmonising evaluation methodologies to facilitate a truly smooth internal market. 

The expansion of ENISA’s mandate includes operating a central EU-wide threat repository, issuing strategic early warnings, managing a unified incident reporting platform, and coordinating large-scale cybersecurity exercises across Member States. These functions position ENISA as the European Union’s definitive technical reference body, bridging the gap between high-level policy and real-time operational coordination.

In the meanwhile, the reform seeks to increase the practical relevance of EU certification schemes. Acknowledging that voluntary schemes have had limited adoption, the European Commission is refining procedures and linking certification more closely with other EU product regulations. This strategy eliminates administrative redundancies and prevents the duplication of audit requirements.

Certification development has also been modernised: new procedures incorporate proportionality principles, encourage international cooperation, and set a clear 12-month timeline for ENISA to propose new schemes. By prioritizing global interoperability, the EU intends to reduce compliance burdens for European companies while establishing its certification framework as a leading international standard.

Most significantly, the revision introduces a step change in supply chain security, treating certification as a tool for technological resilience during geopolitical instability. The creation of mechanisms to identify and monitor high-risk suppliers across eighteen critical sectors represents a decisive move against systemic risks. For the first time, the EU framework allows for the potential withdrawal of deployed products if a supplier is reclassified as high-risk, posing operational and financial implications for critical infrastructure and digital services.

    Strategic imperatives and the evolution of digital governance

The proposed reform introduces a comprehensive change in how organisations must operate within the European digital setting, moving from isolated product-focused security to a holistic approach that emphasises organisational maturity.

Companies will be required to implement advanced governance through documented policies, rigorous internal processes, comprehensive control mechanisms, and risk management structures that transcend traditional technical boundaries. As the certification framework expands to encompass cloud services, 5G networks, managed security services, and overall cyber posture, technology providers will face heightened regulatory scrutiny and extended time-to-market cycles, even as their clients benefit from verified security standards. 

Crucially, the introduction of high-risk supplier mechanisms necessitates a proactive approach to supply chain resilience. This forces entities to assess geopolitical dependencies and monitor interconnected infrastructure. Organizations must, therefore, prepare for the potential replacement of hardware and revise contractual frameworks to mitigate the operational shocks of supplier reclassification. 

For small and medium-sized enterprises, this shift creates a dual challenge. Increased reliance on certified vendors may simplify security management while simultaneously driving up procurement costs. Consequently, these firms will require a higher degree of technical due diligence to remain competitive.

On the operational side, the centralisation of reporting through ENISA’s unified platform will significantly intensify obligations for “Security Operations Centres” (“SOCs”). These entities, alongside “Computer Security Incident Response Teams” (“CSIRTs”), must integrate deeply with EU-level reporting systems. While this improves situational awareness across the Union, it also introduces considerable administrative burdens. 

Next steps 

The proposal will follow the ordinary legislative procedure, requiring both the European Parliament and the Council to adopt their respective amendments. Afterwards, it will enter a phase of interinstitutional negotiations and technical refinement, aimed at balancing security measures with the practical needs of the market.

Conclusion 

The proposed reform of the “EU Cybersecurity Act” signals a transition from fragmented technical standards to a unified, geopolitically aware governance model.

The consolidation of powers around the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity reduces national divergence and centralises threat reporting and operational coordination at EU level. Certification is now a tool for technological resilience rather than just a quality mark. The power to exclude high-risk suppliers in critical sectors forces a fundamental reassessment of thirdparty dependencies and hardware lifecycles. Closer alignment between certification schemes and horizontal product legislation increases the regulatory weight of EU certificates in determining market access and competitive positioning. Cybersecurity becomes a board-level responsibility, requiring integrated risk management, structured oversight to ensure alignment with enhanced EU-wide reporting obligations.

GA_Client Alert_Cybersecurity Act_11.03Download

GA-Alliance has recently supported the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) by leading a study on the cross-border Cash-in-Transit (CIT) market.

The study assessed the legal, economic, and operational framework governing the professional cross-border transport of euro cash under Regulation (EU) No 1214/2011. Drawing on extensive stakeholder consultations, the study also examined the Regulation’s practical application more than a decade after its entry into force, identifying key challenges related to enforcement, market functioning, and operational efficiency.

Based on these findings, the study put forward a set of policy-oriented considerations to support the European Commission in shaping an informed position on the future of the Regulation, taking into account the EU’s broader policy objectives, including competitiveness, the digital and green transitions, and Better Regulation principles.

Overview of Cross-Border Euro Cash Transport

The cross-border transport of euro cash is a highly regulated activity within the euro area. Since 2011, this activity has been governed by Regulation (EU) No 1214/2011, which introduced a partially harmonized framework for the professional cross-border transport of cash by road. The Regulation sought to balance fair competition and high safety standards with national flexibility in areas where full harmonization was not considered appropriate.

More than a decade after its entry into force, the Regulation has delivered mixed results. In its 2022 implementation report, the European Commission identified shortcomings, including uneven monitoring and enforcement across Member States, limited awareness of the rules among operators, and operational inefficiencies linked to divergent national transport arrangements. These challenges raised questions about the Regulation’s effectiveness and its continued suitability for the evolving European cash landscape.

Commission Study: Purpose and Scope

Against this backdrop, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs commissioned a comprehensive study to assess the existing economic and legal framework applicable to cross-border Cash-in-Transit (CIT) services. The purpose of the study – which GA-Alliance was entrusted with leading – was to provide the Commission with a robust analytical basis for deciding whether the Regulation should be reviewed.

To this end, the Study delivered an in-depth examination of the legal, economic, and operational dimensions of cross-border CIT activities within the euro area. From a legal perspective, it assessed inconsistencies arising both from the internal design of the Regulation and from its interaction with broader EU policies. From an economic standpoint, it analyzed the structure and functioning of the cross-border CIT market, identifying key constraints to efficiency and competition. The assessment was grounded in extensive stakeholder consultations, ensuring that the analysis reflected practical experience and lessons learned since the Regulation’s adoption.

Building on this analysis, the study explored four alternative policy scenarios designed to address the identified shortcomings. These scenarios ranged from maintaining the existing regulatory framework while strengthening its implementation through non-legislative measures, to simplifying, substantially revising, or repealing the Regulation. Each scenario was assessed also within the European Union’s wider policy agenda, by taking into account the digital and green transitions, the European Commission’s Better Regulation principles, ongoing efforts to reduce administrative burdens and regulatory complexity, and the Draghi Report’s recommendations on strengthening EU competitiveness.

Based on its findings, the study formulated a set of policy-oriented considerations intended to support the European Commission in shaping an informed position on the future of Regulation (EU) No 1214/2011. These considerations aim to enhance legal certainty, improve market functioning, and ensure that the regulatory framework remains fit for purpose in a changing economic and policy environment.

By judgment delivered on 15 January 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on a preliminary reference made by the Consiglio di Stato by order of 26 August 2024.

The referring court asked, in essence, whether Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights preclude a national regime which, in proceedings concerning the supervision of agreements restricting competition and for the purpose of exercising sanctioning powers (without prejudice to remedial powers), does not expressly treat the deadline for the conclusion of the procedure set out in the statement of objections as peremptory, thereby permitting the competition authority to unilaterally extend that deadline by reasoned acts where circumstances arise that lead to an objective or subjective enlargement of the scope of the investigation.

The question arose in the context of proceedings between Imballaggi Piemontesi S.r.l. (“Imballaggi Piemontesi”) and the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (“AGCM”) concerning fines imposed for participation in the corrugated‑board cartel. By decision of 22 March 2017 the AGCM opened an investigation under Article 14 of Law No. 287/1990 and fixed the deadline for its conclusion at 31 May 2018. During the investigation the Authority extended the scope of the procedure both in terms of parties involved and in terms of the conduct under scrutiny, and accordingly postponed the deadline first to 31 December 2018 and subsequently to 19 July 2019. By decision No. 27849 of 17 July 2019 the AGCM found that Imballaggi Piemontesi had participated in an anti‑competitive agreement in the market for corrugated board sheets (the so‑called “sheets agreement”) and imposed a fine of €6,147,746. The Lazio Regional Administrative Court dismissed the company’s challenge, while the Consiglio di Stato upheld the appeal only as to the amount of the fine. Imballaggi Piemontesi brought an action for review (revocazione), alleging that the sanctioning measure was time‑barred because the investigative deadline had been breached, disputing the characterization of that deadline as merely directory rather than peremptory, and requesting that the Consiglio di Stato refer a question to the Court of Justice on the peremptory nature of the investigative deadline set by the AGCM in the act opening the procedure pursuant to Article 6(3) of Presidential Decree No. 217/1998.

The Court of Justice held that national competition authorities “must be able, where necessary in order to be able to impose effective and dissuasive fines for infringements of Union competition law, to defer the deadline for the conclusion of the investigative phase of that procedure.” In that regard, the Court reiterated that national competition authorities must be able to assign different priorities to the complaints submitted to them and therefore enjoy a wide margin of discretion. Consequently, an authority may be obliged to defer the investigative deadline, for example to give priority to other proceedings. The Court further observed that cases under Union competition law frequently require complex factual and economic analysis and that national authorities will often need to adopt numerous investigative acts and measures, which will inevitably extend the duration of the infringement procedure. The Court emphasised that an absolute prohibition on deferring the investigative deadline could impede the imposition of effective and dissuasive fines for infringements of Union competition law and could render the application of the relevant rules practically impossible or excessively difficult, in breach of the principle of effectiveness. Accordingly, the Court confirmed that national competition authorities may defer the investigative deadline where necessary for the imposition of sanctions.

The Court qualified that such a deferral must not result in the exceeding of a reasonable time within which the procedure must be concluded; that assessment is to be made in light of the circumstances of each case, including the complexity of the procedure and the conduct of the parties. The Court specified that any deferral:

must be duly reasoned by the national authority; must be communicated as soon as possible to the undertaking concerned; must be subject to judicial review.

Finally, the Court recalled that a breach of the principle of respect for a reasonable time may justify annulment of a decision only where it entails an infringement of the defence rights of the undertaking concerned. As the Consiglio di Stato had already found, Imballaggi Piemontesi did not demonstrate that the deferral of the investigative deadline prejudiced the exercise of its defence rights in the present case.

On that basis the Court concluded that Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the general principle of the right to good administration, Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding a national rule which does not expressly provide that the investigative deadline fixed in the statement of objections is peremptory, so that the national competition authority may unilaterally defer that deadline by reasoned acts subject to judicial review where circumstances arise that enlarge the subject‑matter of the procedure or the number of undertakings involved, provided that such deferral does not result in exceeding a reasonable time for the conclusion of the investigative phase.

*Reference: Judgment C‑588/24, para. 62.

Online Webinar by GA-Alliance

Online Webinar Event

The finalized EU-Mercosur agreement is much more than a trade deal; it is a shift in the global regulatory landscape. For European companies, it represents the removal of billions in tariffs; for the legal and fiscal world, it introduces a complex web of new sustainability standards, intellectual property rules, and procurement opportunities.

Join us for this online workshop taking place on January 22, 2026, at 4.00pm (CET/GMT+1). We won't just tell you what the agreement says - we will tell you what it means for your bottom line and how to position your business to thrive in this new economic corridor.

WEBINAR LINK Join us for this online workshop taking place:On January 22, 2026At 4.00 pm (CET/GMT+1)Link Webinar SPEAKERSFrancesco Sciaudone, Global Managing Partner, GA-AllianceEduardo Savarese, Of Counsel, GA-Alliance Italy, Full Professor of International Law, Università Federico II, NaplesDaniel Fesler, Partner, GA-Alliance BrusselsJose Allonca, Partner, GA-Alliance ArgentinaPedro Drummond, Partner, GA-Alliance BrazilHanna Lauar, Associate, GA-Alliance BrazilJorge Figueredo Klein, Partner, GA-Alliance ParaguayJonas Bergstein, Partner, GA-Alliance UruguaySimón Guevara, Partner, GA-Alliance VenezuelaJuan Carlos Moncada, Partner, GA-Alliance Columbia

EVENT INVITATION : The EU-Mercosur agreement and the future of transatlantic business

About GA-Alliance

GA-Alliance - an international law and tax firm with a global network spanning 80 countries and a team of over 2,600 professionals - is uniquely positioned to bridge these two worlds. Our multidisciplinary expertise allows us to navigate the intersection of international trade law and cross-border tax strategy with unparalleled precision.

Find us in the LATAM Area: Argentina Bolivia Brasile Cile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Messico Panama Paraguay Perù Repubblica Dominicana Uruguay Venezuela

This analysis provides an overview of the current state of the EU–Mercosur Agreement and explains the transition from negotiation to ratification, marking the beginning of a new and politically sensitive phase.

Against this background, attention is first devoted to the institutional dimension, where the recent formal authorisation by the EU Council to proceed with the signature of the agreement signals a renewed momentum at EU level, while at the same time leaving unresolved a series of significant political and legal challenges that are likely to shape the forthcoming ratification process.

The analysis then turns to the legal architecture of the agreement, providing a concise analysis of the two legal instruments that together constitute the agreement: the “Interim Trade Agreement” and the “EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement”. This section delineates briefly the respective scope and objectives of each instrument and underscores their fundamental distinction, the fact that they are subject to two different ratification procedures.

The following section turns to the issue currently at the centre of the political and institutional debate, namely the potential recourse to provisional application. It focuses on the legal basis enabling the early implementation of trade-related provisions, while also examining the reasons why this option continues to give rise to significant controversy. In this context, particular emphasis is placed on concerns expressed by the European Parliament regarding democratic oversight and institutional balance, as well as on the asymmetric nature of the enforcement mechanisms governing trade obligations as compared with those applicable to sustainability- and climate-related commitments.

The discussion continues considering the positions of Member States and economic stakeholders. It outlines the strong support expressed by export-oriented industries, which anticipate rapid and tangible economic gains, alongside persistent resistance from agricultural producers and a few Member States concerned about potential market disruption, regulatory divergence, and adverse environmental effects.

The final section provides a forward-looking evaluation of where political and institutional attention is expected to concentrate in the coming days and months. It points to the role of the European Parliament, including possible legal initiatives and forthcoming approval decisions, as well as to the choices that may be exercised by the Council regarding provisional application.

Going forward, close attention will be required as developments unfold, given that the forthcoming steps are likely to shape the timing, trajectory and long-term political sustainability of the EU–Mercosur Agreement.

INDEX

The Latest Institutional Development The Interim Trade Agreement The EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement The Provisional Application and the position of the EU Parliament The position of the Member States and Industries What to expect

Download the full article

The Latest Institutional Development

After years of intermittent progress, in early 2026 the EU–Mercosur agreement decisively returned at the top of the European agenda.

The last few days have clarified two things at once: institutional momentum is real, as the European Union has formally paved the way for signature, but the most difficult political challenges now lie in the ratification phase, which could still slow or, for some experts, reshape the path to entry into force.

On 9 January 2026, the EU Council approved the signature of the EU–Mercosur comprehensive partnership and trade agreement package which includes:

the Interim Trade Agreement (“iTA”). and the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (“EMPA”),

Although both are integral components of the same agreement, these two components will follow different institutional procedures. The trade provisions will advance under EU exclusive competence, while the broader Partnership Agreement has been qualified as a mixed agreement.

In practical terms, under Article 218(6) TFEU, both acts must first be approved by the European Parliament but only the EMPA will also be subject to ratification by all Member States.

This “split approach”, as designed by the Commission and endorsed by the Council, was intended to advance the trade agreement, limiting legal and political friction, but it has also fuelled controversy over provisional application, i.e. the possibility of applying trade provisions before full parliamentary approval.

As a result, the process is still far from concluded.

The Interim Trade Agreement

The Interim Trade Agreement is focused on trade and investment liberalisation. It will operate as a separate agreement until the full EMPA comes into force.

Its main goal is to deliver economic benefits as quickly as possible. Indeed, the agreement provides tariff reductions and new market access for a wide range of goods and services. It also includes measures to facilitate investment and to reduce barriers to cross-border trade in services. Furthermore, it includes rules on government procurement which will allow EU companies to take part in public tenders in Mercosur countries.

Under EU law, the Interim Trade Agreement is considered to fall under the European Union’s exclusive competence. Pursuant to Article 218(8) TFEU, this allowed the Council to decide by qualified majority and removed the need for national ratification at this stage. On this legal basis, the Council decision of 9 January formally authorises the signing of the agreement on behalf of the European Union.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa are already preparing to travel to Paraguay, which currently holds Mercosur’s rotating presidency, to sign the agreement probably within the end of the week.

Then, while the European Parliament cannot amend the text, it must decide whether to approve or reject it. The vote is expected to be finely balanced, with Members of the European Parliament likely to vote more along national lines than according to political affiliation.

However, ahead of the vote, MEPs are expected to decide whether to request a legal opinion from the Court of Justice of the EU on the legality of the split approach and the classification of the Interim Trade Agreement as falling under EU exclusive competence. The proposal, first tabled in November 2025 by 145 MEPs, was temporarily blocked pending clarification of the Council’s position. Now, the vote could take place during the next plenary session, starting on 19 January. If approved, the request would likely delay ratification, but it would not necessarily prevent the provisional application of the trade provisions, should the Council decide to proceed.

The EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement

The EMPA establishes a single framework for political dialogue, cooperation, and sectoral engagement between the parties, including a trade and investment pillar that will apply once the agreement enters into force. It aims to strengthen cooperation in key areas such as sustainable development, climate action, digital transformation, human rights. Lastly, the agreement promotes closer coordination on global challenges and supports the exchange of best practices, while reinforcing coordination in multilateral fora.

As said, the Partnership Agreement qualifies as a mixed agreement under Article 217 TFEU. It means that, after the EU Parliament vote, the broader partnership elements would require also national ratifications in EU member states.

The Provisional Application and the position of the EU Parliament

The most debated topic in recent days surrounding the EU-Mercosur Agreement concerns the possibility of its provisional application.

After the signature in Paraguay, under Art. 218(5) TFUE, the Council may decide to provisionally apply the Interim Trade Agreement even before the European Parliament has expressed its vote on it.

Provisional application would be a turning point because it allows key market-access commitments, such as tariff reductions, to apply before the whole Agreement is formally concluded and fully ratified.

The EU Parliament still retains the right to approve or reject the deal later but many MEPs fear that putting the agreement into practice first and asking for political approval afterward, would weaken democratic scrutiny.

Moreover, it has been argued that provisional application creates an inherent asymmetry. Economic benefits can take effect quickly, for example through the immediate reduction or elimination of tariffs, and these commitments are supported by strong enforcement mechanisms, including binding dispute settlement and the possibility of trade retaliation. By contrast, sustainability and climate-related commitments, such as labour and environmental standards, are subject to weaker enforcement, as they rely on dialogue and expert-based procedures rather than trade sanctions.

For these reasons, in response to the European Commission’s proposal, the European Parliament adopted, on 16 December, a position focused on strengthening the rules governing the implementation of the trade agreement:

It adopted a position on bilateral safeguard measures aimed at preventing imports from Mercosur countries from causing serious injury to the EU agricultural sector. The approved text allows the EU to temporarily suspend tariff preferences for sensitive agricultural products, notably poultry and beef, originating from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The Parliament also tightened safeguard activation conditions by lowering import increase thresholds and significantly shortening investigation timelines, enabling faster intervention in cases of market disruption. In addition, it introduced a reciprocity mechanism requiring the Commission to act where credible evidence shows that imports benefiting from tariff preferences do not comply with equivalent EU standards in areas such as environmental protection, animal welfare, food safety or labour conditions. This broadens the legal basis for safeguards beyond purely quantitative market effects.

Finally, on 18 December, Parliament and Council negotiators reached an informal agreement on the main parameters of the safeguard legislation. The provisional compromise clarifies the definition of serious injury, strengthens import- and price-based monitoring thresholds, improves data exchange between Member States and the Commission, and reinforces continuous market surveillance. Although still subject to formal adoption, this agreement aims to significantly increase legal certainty regarding the operation of safeguards once tariff concessions take effect.

However, at the beginning of 2026, the latest Council’s decision, which kept the option of provisional application open, once again fuelled scepticism, as it could be used if Parliament delays ratification by requesting a legal opinion from the Court of Justice of the European Union.

In this context, also Commission officials intervened and tried to reassure the lawmakers that there is no intention to circumvent Parliament and that provisional application would not automatically follow the signature in Paraguay, especially given that the Mercosur countries would also require time to ratify the agreement.

In this particularly tense political and interinstitutional climate, attention is currently focused on the European Parliament, to see whether it will decide to refer the matter to the Court, and, if so, on the Council, to assess whether it will actually make use of the option of provisional application.

The position of the Member States and Industries

Positions among EU member states and economic actors remain sharply divided, largely along sectoral and national lines.

Export-oriented industries across manufacturing, chemicals, automotive components, and agri-food processing broadly support the agreement. For these sectors, the EU–Mercosur deal delivers tangible commercial gains by eliminating high tariffs on EU exports (duties that currently reach up to 35% on products such as car parts and alcoholic beverages) and by reducing non-tariff barriers in a fast-growing South American market. From this perspective, the agreement strengthens EU competitiveness and reinforces supply-chain diversification at a time of global economic fragmentation.

On the other hand, opposition remains strong among agricultural producers and several member states with politically influential farming sectors. France has emerged as the most vocal critic, joined by Italy, Ireland, Poland, Austria and Hungary, all of which have raised concerns about the impact of duty-free quotas granted to Argentina and Brazil for beef, poultry and other sensitive products, like rice and sugar. While Mercosur governments argue that these quotas are limited and commercially modest, many European farmers fear being undercut by imports produced with different rules on animal-welfare and environmental standards. These concerns are heightened by the perception that EU farmers face rising compliance costs linked to pesticide restrictions, animal welfare rules and climate policies.

Nonetheless, some experts pointed out that while European farmers failed to block the EU–Mercosur trade agreement, they ultimately emerged politically stronger. The deal moved forward only after Brussels introduced extensive safeguards and tighter import controls. For example, the EU can suspend tariff-free imports if market disruption occurs. The Commission has also pledged enhanced border controls and new rules to prevent the import of products treated with pesticides banned in the EU. It is also important to consider the large budgetary concessions made to the agriculture industry. In the EU's upcoming long-term budget, the Commission announced a €45 billion budget manoeuvre that would enable Member States to allocate greater funds to farmers. Yet, these assurances have not fully softened opposition from farming unions or from green and left-wing political groups, which continue to warn that the agreement risks accelerating deforestation, both in EU and South America, undermining indigenous rights, and weakening environmental protections.

What to expect

In the immediate term, attention will focus on three closely connected institutional milestones.

First, the signature of the agreement in Paraguay. Second, the spotlight will shift to the European Parliament, whose consent is required to move forward the final approval. It also remains to be seen whether the European Parliament will seek a legal opinion from the Court of Justice, a move that could delay the agreement’s ratification by several months. Third, debate will intensify around the sequencing of implementation, particularly the possibility of provisional application of the trade provisions while waiting for full ratification of the broader Partnership Agreement. 

Taken together, these steps suggest that while EU–Mercosur has decisively moved beyond diplomatic stagnation, its future now lays less on negotiation and more on domestic politics and legal strategies.

 

Follow us on LinkedIn

 Discover Our Team

Bruxelles Team

Download the full article

December 18, 2025

Energy: the General Court annuls ACER’s decision concerning the management of electricity markets

Index

The case Relevance of the case

The case

With its judgement in the joined cases T-600/23 and T-612/23, published on the 1st of October 2025, the General Court annulled a decision of the Board of Appeal of the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (“ACER”) – which confirmed ACER’s decision on capacity calculation methodologies for electricity transmission in the ‘Core[GL1] ’ region and namely in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Croatia, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia ( “Core region”).

Pursuant to the now repealed Regulation No 714/200[GA2] 9[1], the European Commission adopted Regulation (EU) 2015/1222[2], establishing guidelines on capacity allocation and congestion management in the electricity sector. This regulation sets out requirements for cross-zonal capacity allocation[3] [GL3] and congestion management[4] [GL4] in the day-ahead[5] [GL5] and intraday markets[GL6] [6], [GA7] including the definition of common methodologies for calculating the day-ahead and intraday cross-zonal capacity within different regions. Article 20, in particular, lays down the rules for the introduction of capacity calculation methodologies using a “flow-based approach”, which is defined as a “capacity calculation method in which energy exchanges between zones are limited by power transfer distribution factors (“PTDFs”) and available margins on critical network elements”[7]. The capacity calculation for the Core region applies this flow-based approach.

In accordance with Article 9(1) and Article 20(2) of Regulation 2015/1222, the Transmission System Operators (“TSOs”) of each capacity calculation region are required to develop proposals for capacity calculation methodologies and submit them to the relevant National Regulatory Authorities (“NRAs”) for approval. Pursuant to Article 9(10), (11) and (12), the NRAs concerned must try to reach an agreement and adopt a decision on the TSOs’ proposals. If no agreement can be reached, ACER is required to adopt a decision on the TSOs’ proposals or on a revised version thereof.

In the present case, after the NRAs failed to reach an agreement on the proposals submitted to them by the TSOs of the Core region, the matter was referred to ACER, which adopted modified versions of the regional design of the common capacity calculation methodologies through Decision No 02/2019 (“ACER First Decision”).

ACER First Decision was immediately appealed, on 23 April 2019, by Germany’s regulatory authority, Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen (“BNetzA”), before ACER’s Board of Appeal, as well as by the Federal Republic of Germany before the General Court on 2 May 2019.

On 11 July 2019, however, by Decision A-003-2019 (“ACER Appeal Decision”), [GL8] ACER’s Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal brought by BNetzA against the initial decision.  

Despite this, BNetzA did not surrender and, on 21 September 2019, brought an action before the General Court seeking the partial annulment of ACER First Decision, as well as the annulment of ACER Appeal Decision. In 2022, the General Court annulled ACER Appeal Decision, stating that the Board of Appeal had failed to properly assess whether the approved methodologies complied with the requirements under the new Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal electricity market, which had in the meantime been approved and repealed the previous Regulation No 714/2009[GA9] [8]. Following the Court’s ruling, the Board of Appeal confirmed ACER’s initial decision, claiming that the methodologies were indeed in line with the applicable provisions of the new regulation.

In response, both BNetzA and the Federal Republic of Germany brought a new action[GL10]  before the General Court, alleging an infringement of Articles 14 to 16 of Regulation 2019/943 and Article 29(3)(b) of Regulation 2015/1222, and seeking the partial annulment of the Board’s decision, specifically in relation to Articles 5(8)(b), 5(8)(c), and 5(9) of the methodologies. Indeed, these provisions imposed specific requirements on the TSOs of the Core region when proposing internal network elements and the relevant contingencies for capacity calculation, making it impossible – or at least more difficult – to apply capacity calculation to internal network elements. BNetzA and the Federal Republic of Germany essentially argued that nothing in the wording of the provisions of Regulations 2019/943 and 2015/1222 allows the inclusion of an internal network element – significantly influenced by cross-zonal exchanges – in the capacity calculation to be made conditional upon the performance of an economic efficiency analysis and of an impact assessment of increasing the threshold for inclusion.

According to the applicants, the Board’s interpretation was inconsistent with the literal and teleological interpretation of Articles 14 to 16 of Regulation 2019/943 and of Article 29(3)(b) of Regulation 2015/1222, from which it is clear that the capacity calculation must include all internal network elements (and the relevant contingencies) that are influenced by cross-zonal exchanges irrespective of whether or not those elements are structurally congested.

The General Court agreed, finding that ACER had overstepped its authority by introducing requirements not grounded in the applicable legal framework. Specifically, the Court found that the contested interpretation, indeed, infringed Articles 14 to 16 of Regulation 2019/943 and Article 29(3)(b) of Regulation 2015/1222, as they do not permit the introduction, into the methodologies at issue, of the requirements at issue, which impose obligations going beyond the mere communication of the list of internal critical network elements (CNEs) (and the relevant contingencies) meeting the PTDF criterion, as referred to in Article 5(8)(a) of those methodologies[9].

Accordingly, the Court, after joining cases T-600/23 and T-612/23, brought respectively by BNetzA and the Federal Republic of Germany, annulled Decision A-003-2019 of ACER’s Board of Appeal, in so far as it adopted Article 5(8)(b) and (c) and Article 5(9) of the regional design of the day-ahead and intraday common capacity calculation methodologies for the capacity calculation region comprising Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Croatia, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, as set out in ACER’s Decision No 02/2019.

Relevance of the case

The General Court’s annulment of Decision A-003-2019 of ACER’s Board of Appeal marks a significant clarification of the EU’s institutional framework and the limits of ACER’s powers.

This ruling is important for several reasons[GA11] :

Clarification of Regulatory Limits. The Court firmly established that ACER cannot impose additional obligations – such as economic efficiency analyses or impact assessments – that are not explicitly provided for in EU legislation. Specifically, it held that Articles 14 to 16 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 29(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 do not authorize the introduction of requirements that go beyond the mere submission of the list of internal critical network elements (CNEs) that are significantly influenced by cross-zonal exchanges. Institutional Legitimacy and Legal Certainty. The ruling reinforces the principle of institutional balance by limiting ACER’s regulatory discretion. It confirms that EU agencies must operate strictly within the legal framework established by the legislature and cannot reinterpret or expand it in ways that affect the rights and responsibilities of Member States or national regulatory authorities. Protection of National Competence in Market Design. The judgment safeguards the role of Member States and national regulators in shaping electricity market structures – particularly regarding structural congestion and bidding zone configurations – ensuring that EU agencies respect national prerogatives and do not overstep their mandate. Strengthening the Rule of Law in Energy Regulation. By annulling the contested provisions of ACER’s methodologies, the Court emphasized the importance of strict adherence to the legal framework governing the internal electricity market. It also highlighted the need for a literal, contextual and purposive interpretation of EU regulations, ensuring that regulatory bodies act only within the scope of powers delegated to them.

Ultimately, the judgment reinforces the foundational principle that EU institutions must respect the limits of their delegated authority, thereby upholding legal certainty and the rule of law across the Union as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union[GA12] .

Download the comment

[1] Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, Article 18(5). The full text of the Regulation is available at the following link. The referenced Regulation has been repealed by Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity. The full text of the latter Regulation is available at the following link.

[2] Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management. The full text of the latter Regulation is available at the following link.

[3] Cross-zonal capacity allocation refers to the process of determining and assigning the available transmission capacity between different bidding zones (countries or market areas) in the electricity market. It ensures that electricity can flow efficiently and securely across borders – for example, from a zone with surplus generation to a zone with higher demand – while preventing network congestion and maintaining system reliability.

[4] Congestion management refers to the set of rules, procedures, and actions used to prevent or relieve network congestion in electricity transmission systems. Congestion occurs when the physical limits of the transmission network prevent all desired electricity exchanges between market participants from being realized simultaneously. The goal of congestion management is to ensure efficient use of the transmission network, maintain system security, and facilitate fair and non-discriminatory access to cross-border capacity.

[5] Day-ahead market time-frame’ means the time-frame of the electricity market until the day-ahead market gate closure time, where, for each market time unit, products are traded the day prior to delivery. See for reference Article 2(34) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.

[6] Intraday market time-frame’ means the time-frame of the electricity market after intraday cross-zonal gate opening time and before intraday cross-zonal gate closure time, where for each market time unit, products are traded prior to the delivery of the traded products. See for reference Article 2(37) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.

[7] See for reference Article 2(9) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.

[8] Judgement T-600/23 and T-612/23, par. 13.

[9] Judgement T-600/23 and T-612/23, par. 85.

 [GL1]Speghiamo in nota chi sono le Core region in nota

 [GA2]Please provide the footnote with the link to the Regulation (as added now in track changes) along with the status of it (repealed( and cite the exact provision providing for the possibility of adopting guidelines.

 [GL3]Spieghiamo anche questo

 [GL4]Anche questo

 [GL5]Mettiamo in nota questi concetti

 [GL6]Anche questo

 [GA7]In the relevant footnotes explaining the terms, please also add the specific provision where they are mentioned.

 [GL8]Qui quello che rileva sono le tempistiche, quindi dobbiamo metterle

 [GA9]Please add reference to the General Court’s ruling and specific paragraph reflecting the content of the sentence.

 [GL10]Davanti a chi?

 [GA11]In the core points of the ruling that are exposed below, it is suggested that reference to the specific paragraphs of the ruling are referenced in footnotes or in brackets in the main text.

 [GA12]Suggestion: here you could add a reference to the EU Treaties providing for the rule of law to highlight also the importance of the ruling.