On July 16th, 2026, the EU issued two sets of binding specification measures to Google under the Digital Markets Act.

The aim of the first specification measure is to ensure that competitors' Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) services can compete with Google's own AI services, such as Gemini, by having equal access to features on Google's Android devices.

The aim of the second specification measure is to rebalance the playing field by giving third-party search engines access to search data that only Google Search can collect at scale.  

INDEX

• FACTUAL BACKGROUND
• LEGAL BACKGROUND
• THE SPECIFICATION DECISIONS
• INTEROPERABILITY WITH GOOGLE ANDROID
• GOOGLE SEARCH DATA
• IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISIONS: A PATTERN OF ENFORCEMENT

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Google's relationship with EU competition enforcers did not begin with the Digital Markets Act (“DMA” or the “Act”). By the time the DMA entered into force, the Commission had already spent the better part of a decade building a record of formal antitrust cases against the company, mostly under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which focuses on the prohibition of abuse of a dominant market position. Google has been fined multiple times over its infringements, with record sanctions including €2.42 billion for favouring Google Shopping in 2017 and €4.34 billion for tying Android to Google's own apps and services in 2019. Said records are part of the reason Google was one of the first companies the Commission had in mind when it began designing a faster, more predictable alternative to case-by-case litigation.

That alternative arrived on 6 September 2023, when the Commission formally designated Alphabet, alongside Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta and Microsoft, as a gatekeeper under Article 3 of the DMA.[1]  The designation was not a discretionary judgement call in Google's case as the company comfortably met the quantitative thresholds set out in Article 3(2) of the Act:  EU revenues above €7.5 billion in each of the preceding three years, a core platform service used by more than 45 million monthly active end users and at least 10,000 business users in the EU, and a presence sustained over three consecutive years. These three margins create a rebuttable presumption of gatekeeper status. Eight of Google's services were swept into the designation as core platform services in their own right: Google Search, Google Play, Google Maps, YouTube, the Android operating system, Chrome, Google Shopping and Google's online advertising services. No other gatekeeper was designated for as many services at once, a reflecting the real importance of Google's various products as gateways between European businesses and European consumers.

The designation triggered a compliance rush. Under Article 3(10) of the DMA, gatekeepers have six months from designation to bring their conduct into line with the Regulation's obligations, meaning Google was required to be fully compliant across all eight designated services from 7 March 2024. It is what happened after that date, or, more precisely, what Brussels considers not to have happened adequately, that sets the stage for the specification proceedings. These proceedings were opened in January 2026, with the preliminary findings and proposed measures published in April 2026, and the final decisions announced in July 2026. It is worth noting that specification proceedings clarify how a DMA obligation should be implemented to ensure compliance. Specification proceedings are distinct from non-compliance investigations, and do not aim to assess the gatekeeper's compliance with the DMA. Therefore, they do not provide for the imposition of fines.[2]

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 (the “Regulation”), otherwise known as the Digital Markets Act, entered into force in November 2022 and became applicable in May 2023, following of years of case-by-case antitrust enforcement, which made the Commission unable to keep up with the fast evolution of digital markets. The Google Shopping case was Exhibit A for that concern: a practice identified as harmful in 2017 was not definitively confirmed as unlawful by the courts until 2024, by which time the market it was meant to protect had moved on. The DMA's premise is that, in markets characterised by strong network effects, data-driven advantages and high switching costs, gatekeeper platforms can occupy positions so entrenched that waiting years for an Article 102 case to run its course effectively cedes the market to them in the meantime.[3]

The Regulation imposes a set of ex-ante, largely self-executing obligations directly on companies that meet the gatekeeper definition. It regulates ten categories of "core platform service" (i.e. online intermediation services, search engines, social networks, video-sharing platforms, messaging services, operating systems, web browsers, virtual assistants, cloud computing and online advertising) and designates as a gatekeeper any undertaking that meets the qualitative test of Article 3(1): significant impact on the internal market, control of an important gateway between business users and consumers, and an entrenched and durable position, or the foreseeable emergence of one.  Article 3(2) attaches quantitative thresholds that create a presumption of gatekeeper status, subject to rebuttal, while Article 3(8) allows the Commission to designate a company even where those thresholds are not met, following a dedicated market investigation.

The DMA sets out both obligations and prohibitions to be respected by the designated gatekeepers. As some may be open to broad interpretative approaches, the Commission may elaborate iterative clarifications. For these, the Commission can open a specification proceeding under Article 8(2) to define compliance in dialogue with the company before, or instead of, moving to a finding of infringement.

Enforcement sits exclusively with the Commission, unlike ordinary EU antitrust law, which is enforced in parallel by national competition authorities; this centralisation was itself designed to guarantee consistent, EU-wide application of rules that, being a Regulation rather than a Directive, apply directly in all Member States without national transposition. Penalties for non-compliance can reach 10% of a company's total worldwide annual turnover, rising to 20% for repeat infringements, with periodic penalty payments available to compel compliance and, for systematic non-compliance, the possibility of behavioural or even structural remedies.

Having taken into consideration the legal background of the DMA, the two decisions of 16 July 2026 are not an isolated phenomenon but a case study on how the DMA is meant to function.

THE SPECIFICATION DECISIONS

The two specification proceedings were both opened on 27 January 2026 and ran in parallel, with the final decisions both concluding on 16 July. The decisions include binding measures.

The decisions are connected, as both are about whether Google's control over a foundational layer, the Android operating system in one case, the unprocessed information on what people search for in the other, can be used to entrench its own position in the market that increasingly matters most, artificial intelligence, at the expense of everyone trying to compete with Gemini or with Search itself.

INTEROPERABILITY WITH GOOGLE ANDROID

The first decision concerns Article 6(7) of the DMA, which requires a gatekeeper to provide business users and third-party providers with free and effective interoperability with the hardware and software features of its operating system, provided that interoperability does not compromise security or the integrity of the device. Applied to Android, this obligation had, until now, produced little practical change: rival AI assistants competing with Google's own Gemini could be installed on Android phones, but they lacked access to system-level features that Gemini enjoyed by default, such as being triggered by a wake word in the way "Hey Google" activates Google's assistant, or being able to act on a user's behalf inside other apps. The Commission found that roughly 60% of EU users on Android devices were, in practice, locked into a lesser experience with any assistant other than Google's own.[4] The decision specifies that Google must give competing AI providers equivalent access: EU users should be able to trigger their assistant of choice by voice, delegate tasks such as booking a taxi, receive suggested replies inside messaging apps, or ask their assistant about a place they recently visited, which are all capabilities so far reserved for Gemini. The decision also builds in safeguards intended to preserve user privacy, device integrity and security while opening up access.

GOOGLE SEARCH DATA

The second decision concerns Article 6(11), which obliges a gatekeeper operating a search engine to give rival search providers access, on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to anonymised ranking, query, click and view data that it generates from users' interactions with its own search engine. Google had already made some data available by the March 2024 compliance deadline, but the Commission concluded that the implemented changes were not as effective as mandated by the DMA: the scope of data was too narrow and the anonymisation approach was contested. However,  it was unclear whether AI chatbots with search functionality even qualified as eligible recipients. The new decision resolves each of those points. First, it confirms that AI chatbots offering search-like functionality are entitled to receive the data. Second, it requires Google, once the data is anonymised, to share broadly the same information it uses to optimise its own search results. Third, it lays down a multi-layered anonymisation methodology developed with internal and external privacy experts, designed to align with the draft joint guidelines the Commission and the European Data Protection Board are preparing on how the DMA and the GDPR interact.[5] Google retains the ability to assess, before sharing data with a specific recipient, whether doing so would pose a serious cybersecurity or data-protection risk, and the Commission has left itself room to revisit the anonymisation requirements as the market and independent evaluations develop. The decision also sets a formula for pricing the data and a transparent process for requesting access to it.

IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISIONS: A PATTERN OF ENFORCEMENT

This is not the first time that Google finds itself on the wrong side of an EU procedure over data access, self-preferencing or Android control. Three prior enforcement procedures are worth setting alongside the July 2026 decisions.

The first is the long antitrust history under ordinary competition law, rather than the DMA. The 2017 Google Shopping decision, which fined Google €2.42 billion for systematically favouring its own comparison-shopping service in search results, was upheld in full by the European Court of Justice in September 2024, closing a case that had run for the better part of a decade from opening to final judgment. The 2018 Android decision, which fined Google roughly €4.34 billion (later reduced to about €4.1 billion) for bundling Search and Chrome into Android licences and paying manufacturers to keep rival operating systems off their devices, faced the same sanctioning trend on 2 July 2026, when the Court of Justice dismissed Google's final appeal and made the fine definitive. A third case, the 2019 AdSense decision fining Google €1.49 billion over exclusivity clauses that shut out rival search advertising brokers, took a different path: the General Court annulled it in September 2024, the Commission has appealed to the Court of Justice, and the matter remains pending. Most recently, in September 2025, the Commission fined Google €2.95 billion under ordinary antitrust rules for favouring its own ad exchange within the adtech supply chain.[6][7] Read together, these cases describe a single recurring concern: Google using control over a chokepoint, whether search results, Android licensing or the ad stack, to favour outcomes toward its own products.

The second trend is the DMA's own enforcement record. The Commission opened its first non-compliance investigations under the Act in March 2024, a few weeks after the compliance deadline took effect, targeting Apple's and Google's steering rules and Google's self-preferencing in Search under Article 6(5), among others.[8] On 19 March 2025, the Commission sent Google preliminary findings that its search results continued to give Google's own vertical services, such as Google Shopping, Google Flights and Google Hotels, more favourable formatting and placement than rival comparison services, in a manner it considered incompatible with Article 6(5)'s non-discrimination requirement. That case has moved slowly by the DMA's own fast-track standards[9] and, at the time of writing, a formal non-compliance decision, reportedly to include a substantial fine alongside a parallel finding on Google Play's anti-steering rules, is expected imminently, though the Commission has not yet confirmed either the figure or the date. Whatever the outcome, it would follow the template set by the DMA's first-ever sanctions, issued on 23 April 2025, when the Commission fined Apple €500 million for restricting app developers' ability to steer users to purchase options outside the App Store, and fined Meta €200 million for its "consent-or-pay" advertising model. Those two decisions established that the Commission was prepared to use its fining powers early in the DMA's life, not only its power to specify compliance.

The last trend regards the specification-proceeding mechanism used for the July 2026 decisions themselves. The Commission opened the interoperability and search-data proceedings on 27 January 2026 explicitly to "assist" Google in complying with obligations it had already been subject to for nearly two years, language that reflects the DMA's stated preference for dialogue over immediate punishment. That six-month proceeding produced the binding measures now in force. It is a reminder that specification decisions and non-compliance fines are two different enforcement tracks running in parallel against the same company, over conduct that is, at bottom, the same recurring pattern: gatekeeping a chokepoint in ways that keep rivals a step behind.

The argument can be made that the Commission is working double-time to keep up with the changes pushed by the rapidly growing AI digital infrastructure. This pattern of enforcement, coupled with other groundbreaking efforts (see our previous article on the imposition of AI-related interim measures on Meta in June 2026[10]) show a clear strategized effort on behalf of the Commission to keep up, to regulate and to protect both the AI companies as well as the end consumer.  

[1]  Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), available under the followinglink.

[2] Summary of Commission Decision of 19 March 2025 relating to a decision pursuant to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 (Case DMA.100203 – Article 6(7) – Apple – iOS – SP – Features for Connected Physical Devices) (notified under document number C(2025) 3000), available under the following link.

[3] European Commission, the Digital Markets Act, available under the following link.

[4] European Commission: Commission provides guidance to Google for AI interoperability on Android and sharing of Google Search data under the Digital Markets Act, available under the following link.

[5] Ibid.

[6] This decision is currently being contested by Google.

[7] European Commission, "Commission fines Google €2.95 billion over abusive practices in online advertising technology," Press release IP/25/1992, September 2025, available under the following link.

[8] Digital Markets Act (DMA) portal, "Commission finds Apple and Meta in breach of the Digital Markets Act," 23 April 2025, available under the following link.

[9] The Act was designed to produce findings within roughly a year.

[10] INSERT LINK TO PREVIOUS META ARTICLE

On June 9^th, 2026, the EU Commission announced that it is imposing interim measures on Meta while the investigation on a possible abuse of dominance is carried out. The antitrust investigation, opened in December 2025, means to evaluate the legality of Meta’s revised policy which blocks access for AI providers, other than Meta AI, to WhatsApp.[1]

INDEX

• FACTUAL BACKGROUND
• LEGAL BACKGROUND
• THE INTERIM MEASURE
• IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Meta, formerly known as Facebook, acquired WhatsApp in 2014. The merger was given the greenlight by the EU Commission after an extensive study on possible anticompetitive effects in three different relevant markets: consumer communication services, social networking services, and online advertising. The assessment was based on information and promises shared by Facebook regarding the unlikelihood of automated matching between Facebook users’ accounts and WhatsApp users’ accounts following the merger. Nevertheless, in 2016, WhatsApp announced updates to its terms of service and privacy policy, including the possibility of linking WhatsApp users' phone numbers with Facebook users' identities.[2] The Commission reacted by fining Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about the takeover after finding that, contrary to Facebook’s statements from 2014, its staff were aware of the possibility of matching the platforms’ accounts and identities.

Facebook infringed Regulation 1/2003 by intentionally or negligently providing the incorrect or misleading information to the Commission. The fine was meant to act as a deterrent proportional to the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, after taking into consideration all mitigating and aggravating circumstances. It was the Commission’s first ever decision involving the imposition of fines on a company for providing incorrect or misleading information since the entry into force of the 2004 Merger Regulation. There were no other measures taken aside from the fine and the merger continued to set Facebook (now Meta) on the course toward achieving and maintaining a dominant position status. This is the status that proves problematic for the current event.

In October 2025, Meta announced that it would update its WhatsApp Business Terms, effectively banning third-party general purpose Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) assistants from the consumer communication application. The Commission has considered WhatsApp to hold a dominant position in the market since at least January 2023. Therefore, the update to the Terms is considered, at first sight, to be a possible abuse of dominant position, as competing general-purpose AI assistants are precluded from using the platform’s Business Application Programming Interface (“API”).

Starting mid-January 2026, the only AI assistant available on WhatsApp was Meta’s own AI tool (“Meta AI”). The complete exclusion of all competitors was lessened on March 4^th, when a revision of the policy accepted third-party general-purpose AI assistants again on the platform, but levied an access fee which is being classified as a practice possibly equivalent to the previous access ban. Teresa Ribera, executive Vice-President of the Directorate-General for Competition, stated that the fees were so elevated that they could not be economically sustained by competitors.

Formal proceedings were opened by the Commission in December 2025. The decision to initiate antitrust proceedings covered the EEA except for Italy, as the Italian National Competition Authority (AGCM) imposed its own interim measures on Meta in December. Shortly after, a Statement of Objections was released, setting out the Commission’s preliminary view that Meta breached EU antitrust rules by excluding third party AI assistants from accessing and interacting with users on WhatsApp.[3] Meta's conduct risks blocking competitors from entering or expanding in the rapidly growing market for AI assistants.

April 2026 marked the expansion of the investigation to Italy, allowing the study to analyze conduct changes since the initiation of proceedings.

Meta’s response denounces the opening of the investigation as they find that the Commission’s approach imposes unfair conditions, allowing "OpenAI and some of the largest companies in the world [to] use the paid-for WhatsApp Business product for free," a Meta spokesperson said in an email.[4] An appeal will be filed by Meta as they find the investigation to be a “regulatory overreach subsidized by many European companies that pay.”

The substantive investigation into the merits of the case is still active and ongoing.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The investigation of case AT.40134 [CD1] is carried out through the lens of the antitrust laws set out in Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement which prohibit the abuse of dominant positions that may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition within the Single Market.

The proceedings are carried out within the rules and limitations set out by Article 11(6) of Council Regulation No. 1/2003 (Cooperation between Commission and National Authorities)[5] and Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation No. 773/2004 (Initiation of Proceedings)[6].

Pursuant to Article 8(1) Regulation 1/2003, interim measures may be imposed in cases of urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition assessed on a basis of a prima facie finding of infringement. Although such measures are always imposed for a limited amount of time, they can be renewed until the end of the investigation (by June 2029 at the latest for the case at hand).

Meta faces a potential fine of up to 10% of its total turnover in the year preceding the alleged infringement if found to have breached the EU antitrust regulation and may also be subject to daily periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5% of the average daily turnover in the business year preceding the infringement if it does not comply without delay.

THE INTERIM MEASURE

The Commission has concluded that interim measures are warranted to prevent serious and irreparable damage to competition in the growing market for general-purpose AI assistants as Meta holds a dominant position in the market for consumer communication applications and is, at first sight, abusing this position by blocking access to the WhatsApp API. The refusal to provide access to an infrastructure developed for and previously open to third parties created an urgent need to prevent damage to the competition structure of the AI assistant market by stalling the growth of smaller players and new entrants that could possibly challenge large incumbents.

The decision orders Meta to re-instate access for third-party general purpose AI assistants to the platform’s Business API and to re-establish the same terms and conditions that were enforced before the policy change in October 2025, when access to the Programming Interface was free of charge. Those terms are meant to be enforced until the Commission adopts a final decision on the case. Compliance must be immediate, as Meta has five days to implement the measure.

Meta may also appeal the decision ordering the interim measures before the EU Courts pursuant to Section 17 of the Commission Antitrust Manual.

IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION

Although Regulation No. 1/2003 expressly provides for the ability to impose interim measures if, at first sight, there is an infringement of competition law rules, this is only the second decision imposing such measures since 2019. The first and last instance of application of Art. 8(1) was in relation to the Broadcom case (AT.40608). Broadcom was found to have engaged in exclusionary practices and was subject to the first enforcement of interim measures implemented by the Commission. The interim measures decision, which had an implementation duration of three years, was shortly followed by a commitment decision (ex Art. 9 Regulation No. 1/2003) reflecting commitments offered by Broadcom and revised through a market test. Indeed, the commitment decision built on the applied interim measures, extending their effects for an additional seven years. Furthermore, the commitments covered additional areas of the market and more service providers who were in business with Broadcom.[7] Since then, the Commission has only once announced the possible use of interim measures in an investigation on potential competition restrictions on Lufthansa transatlantic routes to and from several airports in the EEA area[8], but it ultimately decided to abandon its request.

We may conclude that interim measures and commitment decisions are connected, as the former appear to suspend problematic behaviors and create incentives for the company under investigation to quickly find a lasting solution to the identified concerns. A commitment decision may also result in the Commission closing the investigation and simply monitoring the status, implementation, and results of said commitments.[9] Although the Commission may, upon request or of its own initiative, reopen the proceedings (e.g. if the undertaking concern acts contrary to their commitments), the prospect of closing the investigation early is a favourable one for the undertakings concerned. No reasonable economic agent wishes to remain involved in an investigation that can span years, under constant hawk-eye monitoring, and possible heavy fines and remedies.

It seems opportune to now start keeping an eye on other future uses of interim measures by the Commission as a tool to push undertakings to step back in line promptly in a way that spares time, money, and other resources that would otherwise be spent on a lengthy investigation. The transition from the monitoring of the implementation of interim measures to the monitoring of commitments is natural and efficient and it is something we are likely to see more of in future antitrust and competition regulation enforcement.

[1] Commission imposes interim measures on Meta to preserve free access to WhatsApp for rival AI assistants. European Commission Press Release, 9 June 2026. Commission imposes interim measures on Meta

[2] Commission Fines Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover, 18 May 2017. IP_17_1369_EN.pdf

[3] Commission Statement of Objections (Meta), 9 February 2026. AT_41034_606.pdf

[4] EU orders Meta to open WhatsApp to rival AI chatbots, BBC, Tom Singleton, 9 June 2026. EU orders Meta to open WhatsApp to rival AI chatbots

[5] Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1/2009-07-01

[6] Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/773/2015-08-06

[7] Ex post evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of EU antitrust remedies GA-Alliance Report 2025

[8] Case AT.40940 Press Release on Supplementary Statement of Objections to Lufthansa to prevent harm to Frankfurt-New York air passengers, 15 January 2025. Press Release

[9] A First in 20 Years: EU Commission imposes interim measures on Broadcom - Lexology

 [CD1]Exclusion of AI competitors from WhatsApp within the meaning of Article 11(6) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 and Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation No 773/2004

TAVOLA ROTONDA - PRIME RIFLESSIONI "A CALDO"

VENERDÌ 17 LUGLIO 2026

Ore 11:30 - 13:00

WEBINAR LIVE | RSVP : Registrati qui

Le tre sentenze di luglio: il regolamento agenti della Federcalcio tedesca (ROGON), il Regolamento FIFA per gli Agenti di Calciatori (RRC Sports) e il c.d. «caso Agnelli», tra diritto della concorrenza e tutela giurisdizionale effettiva.

GA-ALLIANCE | GLOBAL LEGAL & TAX ADVISOR

L'industria dello sport vive un'evoluzione senza precedenti: finanziaria, tra grandi eventi, sviluppo infrastrutturale e turismo sportivo, e istituzionale, nei rapporti con gli ordinamenti statale ed europeo, che affermano la propria preminenza normativa e giurisdizionale sull'autonomia dell'ordinamento sportivo, nazionale e internazionale, come dimostrano le sentenze Super League, Diarra e Seraing.

Dopo la sentenza ROGON del 9 luglio, che ha fissato i criteri di legittimità delle regole federali sugli agenti, il 16 luglio la Corte deciderà sul Regolamento FIFA e sul caso Agnelli: principi destinati a valere ben oltre il calcio, per federazioni, club, atleti e agenti di ogni disciplina. Il giorno dopo il deposito, GA-Alliance | Global legal&tax Advisor — con il team Legal & Tax dedicato allo Sport — propone un confronto «a caldo» con i massimi esperti, per valutarne subito l'impatto economico e giuridico.

Ne discutono

INTRODUCE E MODERA - Francesco Sciaudone - Managing Partner, GA-Alliance

• Giuseppe Chinè Magistrato, Procuratore Federale FIGC - Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio
• Enrico Lubrano Of Counsel, GA-Alliance | Titolare di Diritto dello Sport, Università Luiss Guido Carli
• Roberto Mastroianni Of Counsel, GA-Alliance | Professore Ordinario di Diritto dell'Unione Europea, Università di Napoli Federico II, già Giudice e Presidente di Sezione del Tribunale UE
• Elena Quadri Magistrato, Consigliere di Stato
• Ezio Simonelli Of Counsel, GA-Alliance | Presidente della Lega Serie A
• Francesco Urraro Of Counsel, GA-Alliance | Vice Presidente del Consiglio di Presidenza, Consiglio di Stato

QUANDO: Venerdì 17 luglio 2026, Ore 11:30 - 13:00

DOVE: Webinar live su ZOOM

Compila il form e registrati all'evento live

RSVP | REGISTRATI →