On July 16th, 2026, the EU issued two sets of binding specification measures to Google under the Digital Markets Act.

The aim of the first specification measure is to ensure that competitors' Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) services can compete with Google's own AI services, such as Gemini, by having equal access to features on Google's Android devices.

The aim of the second specification measure is to rebalance the playing field by giving third-party search engines access to search data that only Google Search can collect at scale.  

INDEX

FACTUAL BACKGROUND LEGAL BACKGROUND THE SPECIFICATION DECISIONS INTEROPERABILITY WITH GOOGLE ANDROID GOOGLE SEARCH DATA IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISIONS: A PATTERN OF ENFORCEMENT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Google's relationship with EU competition enforcers did not begin with the Digital Markets Act (“DMA” or the “Act”). By the time the DMA entered into force, the Commission had already spent the better part of a decade building a record of formal antitrust cases against the company, mostly under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which focuses on the prohibition of abuse of a dominant market position. Google has been fined multiple times over its infringements, with record sanctions including €2.42 billion for favouring Google Shopping in 2017 and €4.34 billion for tying Android to Google's own apps and services in 2019. Said records are part of the reason Google was one of the first companies the Commission had in mind when it began designing a faster, more predictable alternative to case-by-case litigation.

That alternative arrived on 6 September 2023, when the Commission formally designated Alphabet, alongside Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta and Microsoft, as a gatekeeper under Article 3 of the DMA.[1]  The designation was not a discretionary judgement call in Google's case as the company comfortably met the quantitative thresholds set out in Article 3(2) of the Act:  EU revenues above €7.5 billion in each of the preceding three years, a core platform service used by more than 45 million monthly active end users and at least 10,000 business users in the EU, and a presence sustained over three consecutive years. These three margins create a rebuttable presumption of gatekeeper status. Eight of Google's services were swept into the designation as core platform services in their own right: Google Search, Google Play, Google Maps, YouTube, the Android operating system, Chrome, Google Shopping and Google's online advertising services. No other gatekeeper was designated for as many services at once, a reflecting the real importance of Google's various products as gateways between European businesses and European consumers.

The designation triggered a compliance rush. Under Article 3(10) of the DMA, gatekeepers have six months from designation to bring their conduct into line with the Regulation's obligations, meaning Google was required to be fully compliant across all eight designated services from 7 March 2024. It is what happened after that date, or, more precisely, what Brussels considers not to have happened adequately, that sets the stage for the specification proceedings. These proceedings were opened in January 2026, with the preliminary findings and proposed measures published in April 2026, and the final decisions announced in July 2026. It is worth noting that specification proceedings clarify how a DMA obligation should be implemented to ensure compliance. Specification proceedings are distinct from non-compliance investigations, and do not aim to assess the gatekeeper's compliance with the DMA. Therefore, they do not provide for the imposition of fines.[2]

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 (the “Regulation”), otherwise known as the Digital Markets Act, entered into force in November 2022 and became applicable in May 2023, following of years of case-by-case antitrust enforcement, which made the Commission unable to keep up with the fast evolution of digital markets. The Google Shopping case was Exhibit A for that concern: a practice identified as harmful in 2017 was not definitively confirmed as unlawful by the courts until 2024, by which time the market it was meant to protect had moved on. The DMA's premise is that, in markets characterised by strong network effects, data-driven advantages and high switching costs, gatekeeper platforms can occupy positions so entrenched that waiting years for an Article 102 case to run its course effectively cedes the market to them in the meantime.[3]

The Regulation imposes a set of ex-ante, largely self-executing obligations directly on companies that meet the gatekeeper definition. It regulates ten categories of "core platform service" (i.e. online intermediation services, search engines, social networks, video-sharing platforms, messaging services, operating systems, web browsers, virtual assistants, cloud computing and online advertising) and designates as a gatekeeper any undertaking that meets the qualitative test of Article 3(1): significant impact on the internal market, control of an important gateway between business users and consumers, and an entrenched and durable position, or the foreseeable emergence of one.  Article 3(2) attaches quantitative thresholds that create a presumption of gatekeeper status, subject to rebuttal, while Article 3(8) allows the Commission to designate a company even where those thresholds are not met, following a dedicated market investigation.

The DMA sets out both obligations and prohibitions to be respected by the designated gatekeepers. As some may be open to broad interpretative approaches, the Commission may elaborate iterative clarifications. For these, the Commission can open a specification proceeding under Article 8(2) to define compliance in dialogue with the company before, or instead of, moving to a finding of infringement.

Enforcement sits exclusively with the Commission, unlike ordinary EU antitrust law, which is enforced in parallel by national competition authorities; this centralisation was itself designed to guarantee consistent, EU-wide application of rules that, being a Regulation rather than a Directive, apply directly in all Member States without national transposition. Penalties for non-compliance can reach 10% of a company's total worldwide annual turnover, rising to 20% for repeat infringements, with periodic penalty payments available to compel compliance and, for systematic non-compliance, the possibility of behavioural or even structural remedies.

Having taken into consideration the legal background of the DMA, the two decisions of 16 July 2026 are not an isolated phenomenon but a case study on how the DMA is meant to function.

THE SPECIFICATION DECISIONS

The two specification proceedings were both opened on 27 January 2026 and ran in parallel, with the final decisions both concluding on 16 July. The decisions include binding measures.

The decisions are connected, as both are about whether Google's control over a foundational layer, the Android operating system in one case, the unprocessed information on what people search for in the other, can be used to entrench its own position in the market that increasingly matters most, artificial intelligence, at the expense of everyone trying to compete with Gemini or with Search itself.

INTEROPERABILITY WITH GOOGLE ANDROID

The first decision concerns Article 6(7) of the DMA, which requires a gatekeeper to provide business users and third-party providers with free and effective interoperability with the hardware and software features of its operating system, provided that interoperability does not compromise security or the integrity of the device. Applied to Android, this obligation had, until now, produced little practical change: rival AI assistants competing with Google's own Gemini could be installed on Android phones, but they lacked access to system-level features that Gemini enjoyed by default, such as being triggered by a wake word in the way "Hey Google" activates Google's assistant, or being able to act on a user's behalf inside other apps. The Commission found that roughly 60% of EU users on Android devices were, in practice, locked into a lesser experience with any assistant other than Google's own.[4] The decision specifies that Google must give competing AI providers equivalent access: EU users should be able to trigger their assistant of choice by voice, delegate tasks such as booking a taxi, receive suggested replies inside messaging apps, or ask their assistant about a place they recently visited, which are all capabilities so far reserved for Gemini. The decision also builds in safeguards intended to preserve user privacy, device integrity and security while opening up access.

GOOGLE SEARCH DATA

The second decision concerns Article 6(11), which obliges a gatekeeper operating a search engine to give rival search providers access, on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to anonymised ranking, query, click and view data that it generates from users' interactions with its own search engine. Google had already made some data available by the March 2024 compliance deadline, but the Commission concluded that the implemented changes were not as effective as mandated by the DMA: the scope of data was too narrow and the anonymisation approach was contested. However,  it was unclear whether AI chatbots with search functionality even qualified as eligible recipients. The new decision resolves each of those points. First, it confirms that AI chatbots offering search-like functionality are entitled to receive the data. Second, it requires Google, once the data is anonymised, to share broadly the same information it uses to optimise its own search results. Third, it lays down a multi-layered anonymisation methodology developed with internal and external privacy experts, designed to align with the draft joint guidelines the Commission and the European Data Protection Board are preparing on how the DMA and the GDPR interact.[5] Google retains the ability to assess, before sharing data with a specific recipient, whether doing so would pose a serious cybersecurity or data-protection risk, and the Commission has left itself room to revisit the anonymisation requirements as the market and independent evaluations develop. The decision also sets a formula for pricing the data and a transparent process for requesting access to it.

IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISIONS: A PATTERN OF ENFORCEMENT

This is not the first time that Google finds itself on the wrong side of an EU procedure over data access, self-preferencing or Android control. Three prior enforcement procedures are worth setting alongside the July 2026 decisions.

The first is the long antitrust history under ordinary competition law, rather than the DMA. The 2017 Google Shopping decision, which fined Google €2.42 billion for systematically favouring its own comparison-shopping service in search results, was upheld in full by the European Court of Justice in September 2024, closing a case that had run for the better part of a decade from opening to final judgment. The 2018 Android decision, which fined Google roughly €4.34 billion (later reduced to about €4.1 billion) for bundling Search and Chrome into Android licences and paying manufacturers to keep rival operating systems off their devices, faced the same sanctioning trend on 2 July 2026, when the Court of Justice dismissed Google's final appeal and made the fine definitive. A third case, the 2019 AdSense decision fining Google €1.49 billion over exclusivity clauses that shut out rival search advertising brokers, took a different path: the General Court annulled it in September 2024, the Commission has appealed to the Court of Justice, and the matter remains pending. Most recently, in September 2025, the Commission fined Google €2.95 billion under ordinary antitrust rules for favouring its own ad exchange within the adtech supply chain.[6][7] Read together, these cases describe a single recurring concern: Google using control over a chokepoint, whether search results, Android licensing or the ad stack, to favour outcomes toward its own products.

The second trend is the DMA's own enforcement record. The Commission opened its first non-compliance investigations under the Act in March 2024, a few weeks after the compliance deadline took effect, targeting Apple's and Google's steering rules and Google's self-preferencing in Search under Article 6(5), among others.[8] On 19 March 2025, the Commission sent Google preliminary findings that its search results continued to give Google's own vertical services, such as Google Shopping, Google Flights and Google Hotels, more favourable formatting and placement than rival comparison services, in a manner it considered incompatible with Article 6(5)'s non-discrimination requirement. That case has moved slowly by the DMA's own fast-track standards[9] and, at the time of writing, a formal non-compliance decision, reportedly to include a substantial fine alongside a parallel finding on Google Play's anti-steering rules, is expected imminently, though the Commission has not yet confirmed either the figure or the date. Whatever the outcome, it would follow the template set by the DMA's first-ever sanctions, issued on 23 April 2025, when the Commission fined Apple €500 million for restricting app developers' ability to steer users to purchase options outside the App Store, and fined Meta €200 million for its "consent-or-pay" advertising model. Those two decisions established that the Commission was prepared to use its fining powers early in the DMA's life, not only its power to specify compliance.

The last trend regards the specification-proceeding mechanism used for the July 2026 decisions themselves. The Commission opened the interoperability and search-data proceedings on 27 January 2026 explicitly to "assist" Google in complying with obligations it had already been subject to for nearly two years, language that reflects the DMA's stated preference for dialogue over immediate punishment. That six-month proceeding produced the binding measures now in force. It is a reminder that specification decisions and non-compliance fines are two different enforcement tracks running in parallel against the same company, over conduct that is, at bottom, the same recurring pattern: gatekeeping a chokepoint in ways that keep rivals a step behind.

The argument can be made that the Commission is working double-time to keep up with the changes pushed by the rapidly growing AI digital infrastructure. This pattern of enforcement, coupled with other groundbreaking efforts (see our previous article on the imposition of AI-related interim measures on Meta in June 2026[10]) show a clear strategized effort on behalf of the Commission to keep up, to regulate and to protect both the AI companies as well as the end consumer.  

[1]  Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), available under the followinglink.

[2] Summary of Commission Decision of 19 March 2025 relating to a decision pursuant to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 (Case DMA.100203 – Article 6(7) – Apple – iOS – SP – Features for Connected Physical Devices) (notified under document number C(2025) 3000), available under the following link.

[3] European Commission, the Digital Markets Act, available under the following link.

[4] European Commission: Commission provides guidance to Google for AI interoperability on Android and sharing of Google Search data under the Digital Markets Act, available under the following link.

[5] Ibid.

[6] This decision is currently being contested by Google.

[7] European Commission, "Commission fines Google €2.95 billion over abusive practices in online advertising technology," Press release IP/25/1992, September 2025, available under the following link.

[8] Digital Markets Act (DMA) portal, "Commission finds Apple and Meta in breach of the Digital Markets Act," 23 April 2025, available under the following link.

[9] The Act was designed to produce findings within roughly a year.

[10] INSERT LINK TO PREVIOUS META ARTICLE

On June 9th, 2026, the EU Commission announced that it is imposing interim measures on Meta while the investigation on a possible abuse of dominance is carried out. The antitrust investigation, opened in December 2025, means to evaluate the legality of Meta’s revised policy which blocks access for AI providers, other than Meta AI, to WhatsApp.[1]

INDEX

FACTUAL BACKGROUND LEGAL BACKGROUND THE INTERIM MEASURE IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Meta, formerly known as Facebook, acquired WhatsApp in 2014. The merger was given the greenlight by the EU Commission after an extensive study on possible anticompetitive effects in three different relevant markets: consumer communication services, social networking services, and online advertising. The assessment was based on information and promises shared by Facebook regarding the unlikelihood of automated matching between Facebook users’ accounts and WhatsApp users’ accounts following the merger. Nevertheless, in 2016, WhatsApp announced updates to its terms of service and privacy policy, including the possibility of linking WhatsApp users' phone numbers with Facebook users' identities.[2] The Commission reacted by fining Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about the takeover after finding that, contrary to Facebook’s statements from 2014, its staff were aware of the possibility of matching the platforms’ accounts and identities.

Facebook infringed Regulation 1/2003 by intentionally or negligently providing the incorrect or misleading information to the Commission. The fine was meant to act as a deterrent proportional to the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, after taking into consideration all mitigating and aggravating circumstances. It was the Commission’s first ever decision involving the imposition of fines on a company for providing incorrect or misleading information since the entry into force of the 2004 Merger Regulation. There were no other measures taken aside from the fine and the merger continued to set Facebook (now Meta) on the course toward achieving and maintaining a dominant position status. This is the status that proves problematic for the current event.

In October 2025, Meta announced that it would update its WhatsApp Business Terms, effectively banning third-party general purpose Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) assistants from the consumer communication application. The Commission has considered WhatsApp to hold a dominant position in the market since at least January 2023. Therefore, the update to the Terms is considered, at first sight, to be a possible abuse of dominant position, as competing general-purpose AI assistants are precluded from using the platform’s Business Application Programming Interface (“API”).

Starting mid-January 2026, the only AI assistant available on WhatsApp was Meta’s own AI tool (“Meta AI”). The complete exclusion of all competitors was lessened on March 4th, when a revision of the policy accepted third-party general-purpose AI assistants again on the platform, but levied an access fee which is being classified as a practice possibly equivalent to the previous access ban. Teresa Ribera, executive Vice-President of the Directorate-General for Competition, stated that the fees were so elevated that they could not be economically sustained by competitors.

Formal proceedings were opened by the Commission in December 2025. The decision to initiate antitrust proceedings covered the EEA except for Italy, as the Italian National Competition Authority (AGCM) imposed its own interim measures on Meta in December. Shortly after, a Statement of Objections was released, setting out the Commission’s preliminary view that Meta breached EU antitrust rules by excluding third party AI assistants from accessing and interacting with users on WhatsApp.[3] Meta's conduct risks blocking competitors from entering or expanding in the rapidly growing market for AI assistants.

April 2026 marked the expansion of the investigation to Italy, allowing the study to analyze conduct changes since the initiation of proceedings.

Meta’s response denounces the opening of the investigation as they find that the Commission’s approach imposes unfair conditions, allowing "OpenAI and some of the largest companies in the world [to] use the paid-for WhatsApp Business product for free," a Meta spokesperson said in an email.[4] An appeal will be filed by Meta as they find the investigation to be a “regulatory overreach subsidized by many European companies that pay.”

The substantive investigation into the merits of the case is still active and ongoing.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The investigation of case AT.40134 [CD1] is carried out through the lens of the antitrust laws set out in Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement which prohibit the abuse of dominant positions that may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition within the Single Market.

The proceedings are carried out within the rules and limitations set out by Article 11(6) of Council Regulation No. 1/2003 (Cooperation between Commission and National Authorities)[5] and Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation No. 773/2004 (Initiation of Proceedings)[6].

Pursuant to Article 8(1) Regulation 1/2003, interim measures may be imposed in cases of urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition assessed on a basis of a prima facie finding of infringement. Although such measures are always imposed for a limited amount of time, they can be renewed until the end of the investigation (by June 2029 at the latest for the case at hand).

Meta faces a potential fine of up to 10% of its total turnover in the year preceding the alleged infringement if found to have breached the EU antitrust regulation and may also be subject to daily periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5% of the average daily turnover in the business year preceding the infringement if it does not comply without delay.

THE INTERIM MEASURE

The Commission has concluded that interim measures are warranted to prevent serious and irreparable damage to competition in the growing market for general-purpose AI assistants as Meta holds a dominant position in the market for consumer communication applications and is, at first sight, abusing this position by blocking access to the WhatsApp API. The refusal to provide access to an infrastructure developed for and previously open to third parties created an urgent need to prevent damage to the competition structure of the AI assistant market by stalling the growth of smaller players and new entrants that could possibly challenge large incumbents.

The decision orders Meta to re-instate access for third-party general purpose AI assistants to the platform’s Business API and to re-establish the same terms and conditions that were enforced before the policy change in October 2025, when access to the Programming Interface was free of charge. Those terms are meant to be enforced until the Commission adopts a final decision on the case. Compliance must be immediate, as Meta has five days to implement the measure.

Meta may also appeal the decision ordering the interim measures before the EU Courts pursuant to Section 17 of the Commission Antitrust Manual.

IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION

Although Regulation No. 1/2003 expressly provides for the ability to impose interim measures if, at first sight, there is an infringement of competition law rules, this is only the second decision imposing such measures since 2019. The first and last instance of application of Art. 8(1) was in relation to the Broadcom case (AT.40608). Broadcom was found to have engaged in exclusionary practices and was subject to the first enforcement of interim measures implemented by the Commission. The interim measures decision, which had an implementation duration of three years, was shortly followed by a commitment decision (ex Art. 9 Regulation No. 1/2003) reflecting commitments offered by Broadcom and revised through a market test. Indeed, the commitment decision built on the applied interim measures, extending their effects for an additional seven years. Furthermore, the commitments covered additional areas of the market and more service providers who were in business with Broadcom.[7] Since then, the Commission has only once announced the possible use of interim measures in an investigation on potential competition restrictions on Lufthansa transatlantic routes to and from several airports in the EEA area[8], but it ultimately decided to abandon its request.

We may conclude that interim measures and commitment decisions are connected, as the former appear to suspend problematic behaviors and create incentives for the company under investigation to quickly find a lasting solution to the identified concerns. A commitment decision may also result in the Commission closing the investigation and simply monitoring the status, implementation, and results of said commitments.[9] Although the Commission may, upon request or of its own initiative, reopen the proceedings (e.g. if the undertaking concern acts contrary to their commitments), the prospect of closing the investigation early is a favourable one for the undertakings concerned. No reasonable economic agent wishes to remain involved in an investigation that can span years, under constant hawk-eye monitoring, and possible heavy fines and remedies.

It seems opportune to now start keeping an eye on other future uses of interim measures by the Commission as a tool to push undertakings to step back in line promptly in a way that spares time, money, and other resources that would otherwise be spent on a lengthy investigation. The transition from the monitoring of the implementation of interim measures to the monitoring of commitments is natural and efficient and it is something we are likely to see more of in future antitrust and competition regulation enforcement.

[1] Commission imposes interim measures on Meta to preserve free access to WhatsApp for rival AI assistants. European Commission Press Release, 9 June 2026. Commission imposes interim measures on Meta

[2] Commission Fines Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover, 18 May 2017. IP_17_1369_EN.pdf

[3] Commission Statement of Objections (Meta), 9 February 2026. AT_41034_606.pdf

[4] EU orders Meta to open WhatsApp to rival AI chatbots, BBC, Tom Singleton, 9 June 2026. EU orders Meta to open WhatsApp to rival AI chatbots

[5] Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1/2009-07-01

[6] Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/773/2015-08-06

[7] Ex post evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of EU antitrust remedies GA-Alliance Report 2025

[8] Case AT.40940 Press Release on Supplementary Statement of Objections to Lufthansa to prevent harm to Frankfurt-New York air passengers, 15 January 2025. Press Release

[9] A First in 20 Years: EU Commission imposes interim measures on Broadcom - Lexology

 [CD1]Exclusion of AI competitors from WhatsApp within the meaning of Article 11(6) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 and Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation No 773/2004

EU-MERCOSUR: STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES AND PRACTICALIMPLICATIONS FOR ITALIAN BUSINESSESKey takeaways from the DG TRADE Italian Edition discussion – 26 May 2026

INDEX

Executive Summary Market Access, Competitiveness and Regulatory Simplification Sector-Specific Implications and Strategic Considerations for Italy Conclusions

Executive Summary

The DG TRADE Italian Edition discussion on 26 May 2026 provided a practical overview of what the EU-Mercosur Agreement could mean for Italian businesses, placing the debate within a broader geopolitical and commercial context. The discussion made clear that the agreement is being framed not only as a trade instrument, but also as a strategic response to Europe’s declining competitive position in parts of Latin America, particularly in comparison with China’s growing economic footprint in the region.

A central message from the speakers was that the agreement would create opportunities for European exporters by reducing both tariffs and administrative barriers, while preserving EU regulatory standards. For Italian businesses, this could translate into stronger market access, improved protection for geographical indications, and a more predictable commercial environment in sectors where Italy has established strengths. At the same time, concerns around sensitive agricultural imports were directly addressed, with assurances that EU food safety requirements and market safeguard mechanisms remain fully in place.

Market Access, Competitiveness and Regulatory Simplification

Much of the discussion focused on the practical implications of the agreement for European companies seeking to expand in Mercosur markets. Speakers emphasized that the commercial value of the agreement goes well beyond tariff reductions. A major advantage lies in the reduction of non-tariff barriers that often make exporting costly and slow, including duplicative technical checks, burdensome certification procedures, and import authorization processes that create uncertainty for businesses.

The agreement was also presented as a strategic tool to strengthen Europe’s competitive position in Latin America at a time when Chinese firms have become increasingly embedded in the region. According to the speakers, European businesses currently face a structural disadvantage in markets such as Brazil and Argentina, where China has consolidated its presence while European market share has weakened. Because China does not currently benefit from an equivalent trade arrangement with Mercosur, the agreement could improve the relative position of European exporters, particularly in sectors such as automotive manufacturing, fashion, wine, and industrial goods where Italian companies are especially active.

Sector-Specific Implications and Strategic Considerations for Italy

A more technical part of the discussion focused on rules of origin, which will determine whether products qualify for preferential tariff treatment. Speakers acknowledged that these requirements can be complex and differ significantly depending on the sector, especially where supply chains rely on components sourced globally. This means that businesses will need to assess carefully whether their products can effectively benefit from the agreement in practice.For Italy, the agreement was presented as especially relevant for industries that rely on quality, brand value, and product authenticity. The protection of geographical indications was highlighted as a concrete gain, with products such as Parmigiano Reggiano expected to benefit from stronger recognition and protection in Mercosur markets. Agricultural sensitivities were also openly discussed, particularly concerning beef imports, with the Commission underlining that monitoring tools and safeguard measures are intended to mitigate risks for vulnerable European sectors. The discussion also briefly addressed Mercosur’s evolving political composition, including Bolivia’s prospective accession and Venezuela’s continued suspension, both of which may shape future developments.

Conclusions

The discussion framed the EU-Mercosur Agreement as a strategic attempt to combine economic opportunity with geopolitical positioning, offering new openings for European businesses while seeking to preserve the regulatory safeguards and market protections that remain central to the EU’s trade approach.

The EU-Mercosur Agreement is being positioned as both a commercial opportunity and astrategic instrument to strengthen Europe’s presence in Latin America.

For Italian businesses, the most immediate potential benefits lie in improved market access,reduced administrative barriers, and stronger protection for high-value branded products.

Real commercial gains will depend on companies’ ability to navigate technical implementation issues, particularly rules of origin and product-specific compliance requirements.

While sensitivities remain in agriculture, the Commission’s message was that regulatoryprotections and monitoring mechanisms are designed to ensure that market opening does not come at the expense of EU standards or vulnerable sectors.

Il 23 aprile 2026 l’Unione europea ha adottato il 20° pacchetto di sanzioni contro la Russia e, in parallelo, ha rafforzato il regime di misure restrittive nei confronti della Bielorussia. A colpire, più ancora dell’ampiezza delle misure, è il messaggio politico e operativo che il pacchetto trasmette: l’UE vuole passare con decisione dalla logica dell’“aggiunta di nuovi divieti” a una stagione di enforcement più serrato e di chiusura delle vie di elusione. In altre parole, non si tratta soltanto di estendere il perimetro delle restrizioni, ma di rendere più difficile—e più costoso—aggirarle, intervenendo sulle infrastrutture, sulle reti di intermediazione e sui canali finanziari che negli ultimi mesi hanno consentito di mantenere attivi flussi commerciali e logistici verso la Russia.

Questa impostazione emerge fin dalle prime misure nel settore energetico e marittimo. Il pacchetto include nuove designazioni che colpiscono l’industria energetica russa lungo l’intera catena del valore, dall’esplorazione e produzione fino alla raffinazione e al trasporto, con l’obiettivo di comprimere capacità e ricavi nel medio‑lungo periodo. Ma il salto di qualità sta soprattutto nella pressione sull’ecosistema della shadow fleet: non più soltanto navi, bensì un insieme più ampio di attori che ruotano attorno alle esportazioni di petrolio e prodotti energetici—operatori in Paesi terzi, assicurazione marittima, logistica—con l’aggiunta di ulteriori unità fino ad arrivare a un totale indicato di 632 navi sanzionate, soggette a divieto di accesso ai porti e di prestazione di servizi. La scelta di prevedere anche la possibilità di rimuovere unità dalla lista (quando il comportamento torna conforme) è indicativa: la lista diventa uno strumento dinamico, che incentiva la compliance e rende più rilevante la qualità delle evidenze e della tracciabilità dei comportamenti degli operatori.

Nello stesso filone si inserisce l’attenzione alla vendita di tanker da parte di operatori europei. A partire dal 24 aprile 2026 sono introdotti presidi specifici—tra cui una due diligence rafforzata e una clausola contrattuale obbligatoria “no Russia”—per ridurre il rischio che unità cedute da soggetti UE finiscano, direttamente o indirettamente, a supportare l’export energetico russo. Questo punto è particolarmente significativo perché sposta parte del presidio sanzionatorio sul terreno della contrattualistica: non basta “sapere” a chi si vende, ma occorre dimostrare di avere impostato il deal con cautele idonee a prevenire usi vietati, prevedendo rimedi, verifiche e meccanismi di reazione in caso di deviazioni.

Il pacchetto introduce poi una misura dal forte valore simbolico e pratico: la designazione di infrastrutture portuali. Vengono sanzionati due porti russi, Murmansk e Tuapse, ma soprattutto compare per la prima volta un terminal in un Paese terzo—il Karimun Oil Terminal in Indonesia—ritenuto collegato alla shadow fleet e a pratiche di aggiramento del price cap. È una scelta che segnala la crescente disponibilità dell’UE a intervenire su nodi “fuori perimetro” geografico, quando questi sono considerati funzionali all’elusione.

L’area finanziaria conferma la stessa filosofia. Da un lato, l’UE estende il divieto di operare con un ulteriore gruppo di banche russe, portando a 70—secondo i dati riportati—il totale degli istituti esclusi dal mercato interno UE, salvo limitate eccezioni. Dall’altro, la vera innovazione sta nel focus sugli intermediari in Paesi terzi: il pacchetto estende i transaction bans a banche localizzate in giurisdizioni quali Kirghizistan, Laos e Azerbaigian, ritenute coinvolte nel supporto allo sforzo bellico o nella facilitazione di condotte elusive, anche tramite collegamenti con il sistema di messaggistica finanziaria russo (SPFS). Per gli operatori europei ciò significa che il rischio non è più “solo Russia”: si sposta sulle catene di pagamento, sulle banche di transito e su architetture che consentono di far arrivare valore economico a destinazioni vietate attraverso passaggi intermedi.

A rendere più complesso lo scenario contribuiscono le misure su crypto‑asset e servizi digitali. Dal 24 maggio 2026 è previsto un divieto settoriale sulle transazioni con crypto‑asset service providers russi e piattaforme decentralizzate utilizzate per aggirare le sanzioni. Le restrizioni si estendono inoltre a strumenti considerati “abilitanti” per l’elusione—come alcune soluzioni crypto rouble‑linked e iniziative di valuta digitale—e colpiscono intermediari che facilitano pagamenti internazionali “per conto” della Russia. Il punto, per le imprese, non è soltanto aggiornare lo screening: è riconoscere che la compliance sanzionatoria e i controlli AML/fintech si stanno avvicinando, imponendo procedure più robuste su wallet, piattaforme, service provider e modalità di regolamento.

Anche sul versante commerciale e industriale il pacchetto mantiene un’impostazione “a tenaglia”: da un lato nuovi divieti e restrizioni su export verso la Russia—con riferimento a beni di valore significativo e a categorie di prodotti che, direttamente o indirettamente, possono sostenere capacità industriali e militari—dall’altro nuovi divieti di import su metalli, chimici e minerali, oltre all’introduzione di una quota sull’ammoniaca per limitare i livelli di approvvigionamento. In parallelo emerge un ampliamento importante del perimetro dei servizi vietati, con una specifica proibizione sulla fornitura di cybersecurity services a entità russe e restrizioni su servizi di sicurezza gestita. Si tratta di un’evoluzione che impatta direttamente operatori ICT, managed service providers e società che offrono servizi digitali con delivery transfrontaliero: la “destinazione” del servizio e la natura della controparte diventano variabili determinanti, anche quando non esistono beni fisici in movimento.

Il cuore del pacchetto, tuttavia, è probabilmente la parte relativa all’anti‑circumvention. Per la prima volta l’UE attiva il meccanismo anti‑elusione, citando il caso del Kirghizistan e la persistenza di re‑export verso la Russia di beni di origine UE (tra cui macchine utensili e apparecchiature telecom), beni indicati come utilizzabili nella produzione di droni e missili. È un messaggio senza ambiguità: l’UE è pronta a intervenire più direttamente sui corridoi geografici e commerciali dell’elusione e a espandere le liste di soggetti considerati facilitatori. Nello stesso quadro si collocano l’estensione dell’elenco dei beni soggetti a divieto di transito via territorio russo e l’ampliamento del broadcasting ban anche a entità che replicano contenuti di soggetti già sanzionati.

Accanto al rafforzamento dei divieti, il pacchetto introduce anche un capitolo spesso trascurato nel dibattito pubblico ma cruciale per chi opera sul mercato: la protezione legale degli operatori UE. L’UE mira a tutelare imprese e cittadini europei da misure ritorsive e contenziosi abusivi, prevedendo strumenti che consentano di reagire a iniziative giudiziarie aggressive e di cercare compensazione se decisioni ingiuste vengono eseguite in Paesi terzi. Sullo sfondo vi sono anche misure che colpiscono beneficiari della cosiddetta “temporary management”—descritta come una forma di espropriazione de facto di operatori UE—oltre a restrizioni collegate all’appropriazione indebita di proprietà intellettuale di imprese europee in Russia. Il pacchetto include inoltre limitazioni rilevanti per ricerca e innovazione (divieto di accettare finanziamenti/donazioni/grant dal governo russo) e una previsione di equilibrio: in determinate condizioni, è ammessa la possibilità di utilizzare fondi congelati per coprire i costi di un arbitrato, con requisiti stringenti sulla natura del destinatario e sull’assenza di collegamenti sanzionati.

Quanto alla Bielorussia, il pacchetto conferma l’allineamento progressivo al regime Russia. Sono previste nuove designazioni e restrizioni che replicano, in larga misura, le misure settoriali già viste per Mosca—incluse limitazioni su crypto e servizi—e viene estesa la durata del regime fino al 28 febbraio 2027. Di particolare rilievo, nella prospettiva “global enforcement”, è il fatto che venga inclusa nel regime Bielorussia una società statale cinese, a testimonianza della volontà UE di colpire le catene di fornitura militare anche quando si collocano al di fuori del perimetro tradizionale.

In conclusione, il 20° pacchetto segnala un’evoluzione: le sanzioni UE non sono più solo un insieme di divieti settoriali e listing, ma un sistema sempre più orientato a interrompere le reti che rendono possibile l’elusione—logistiche, finanziarie, digitali—e a fornire strumenti di tutela a chi, in Europa, subisce pressioni o ritorsioni. Per le imprese, la conseguenza è chiara: la compliance deve diventare più “difendibile”, cioè documentata, contrattualizzata e capace di reggere a controlli ex post. Non basta verificare la controparte diretta; occorre comprendere l’operazione nel suo insieme: rotte, intermediari, canali di pagamento, beneficiari finali, catene di proprietà e destinazioni effettive.

GA Alliance assiste regolarmente operatori europei e internazionali nell’adeguamento dei programmi sanzionatori e di export control, nella revisione della contrattualistica (incluso inserimento di clausole anti‑elusione e meccanismi di audit), nonché nella gestione del rischio contenzioso e nelle questioni di tutela patrimoniale e arbitrale connesse a misure restrittive.

Lo scorso venerdì, a Roma, si è svolto un incontro di particolare rilievo per il settore sportivo e per la comunità giuridica: il convegno “La Giustizia nello Sport”, dedicato all’analisi dell’attuale sistema italiano e alle prospettive di riforma alla luce del diritto dell’Unione Europea. L’appuntamento ha riunito professionisti, studiosi e rappresentanti delle istituzioni sportive in un momento in cui il rapporto tra autonomia dell’ordinamento sportivo e vincoli sovranazionali è al centro di un confronto sempre più serrato.

Nel corso dell’evento è stata presentata la Nota redatta da GA‑Alliance, un documento che ricostruisce con rigore sistematico il quadro normativo, le criticità strutturali e gli scenari che potrebbero aprirsi con la decisione della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea nel caso Agnelli‑Arrivabene, attesa nel primo semestre del 2026.

Un settore sempre più integrato nel mercato europeo

La Nota sottolinea come l’industria dello sport abbia ormai assunto una dimensione economica tale da non poter essere considerata un ambito separato dal diritto comune. La giurisprudenza europea, dalla sentenza Bosman alla più recente European Superleague, ha chiarito che le attività sportive professionistiche rientrano nel campo di applicazione del diritto dell’Unione ogniqualvolta assumano natura economica. L’art. 165 TFUE, che richiama la “specificità dello sport”, non crea zone franche, ma impone un’applicazione delle norme europee che tenga conto delle peculiarità del fenomeno senza derogare ai principi fondamentali, dalle libertà di circolazione alle regole di concorrenza.

In questo contesto, l’Italia si trova a gestire un calendario di eventi sportivi internazionali di portata eccezionale, che richiedono stabilità regolatoria, certezza del diritto e piena conformità agli standard europei. La recente introduzione del valore costituzionale dello sport nell’art. 33 Cost. rende ancora più stringente l’esigenza di un sistema di giustizia sportiva coerente con i principi dell’ordinamento interno ed europeo.

Le criticità del modello italiano

La struttura attuale della giustizia sportiva italiana, delineata dal decreto‑legge n. 220/2003 e dalla legge n. 280/2003, si fonda su una netta separazione tra ordinamento sportivo e giurisdizione statale. Tuttavia, l’interpretazione giurisprudenziale consolidata ha prodotto un risultato che oggi appare difficilmente compatibile con il diritto dell’Unione: il giudice amministrativo non può annullare né sospendere in via cautelare le sanzioni disciplinari sportive, potendo intervenire solo attraverso la tutela risarcitoria.

La Nota ricostruisce il percorso che ha condotto a questo assetto, dalle pronunce della Corte Costituzionale del 2011 e del 2019 fino alle più recenti applicazioni. Il sistema, pur ritenuto costituzionalmente legittimo, presenta evidenti limiti rispetto ai requisiti europei di effettività della tutela giurisdizionale, indipendenza degli organi giudicanti e garanzie procedurali. Il deficit di terzietà degli organi endofederali, la mancanza di criteri uniformi di proporzionalità delle sanzioni e l’estensione automatica delle misure disciplinari in ambito UEFA e FIFA amplificano ulteriormente le criticità.

Il caso Agnelli‑Arrivabene e il rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia UE

Il convegno ha dedicato ampio spazio al caso che oggi rappresenta il punto di snodo del dibattito: il rinvio pregiudiziale sollevato dal TAR Lazio nel procedimento promosso da Andrea Agnelli e Maurizio Arrivabene. La vicenda, originata dal procedimento FIGC sulle plusvalenze, ha posto in discussione non solo la proporzionalità delle sanzioni irrogate, ma l’intero impianto della legge n. 280/2003.

Le tre questioni sottoposte alla Corte di Giustizia riguardano la compatibilità del sistema italiano con l’art. 47 della Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali, la conformità delle sanzioni alle libertà di circolazione e la relazione tra autonomia sportiva e norme antitrust. Le Conclusioni dell’Avvocato Generale Dean Spielmann, depositate il 18 dicembre 2025, hanno riconosciuto che un divieto biennale di operare nel calcio professionistico può essere compatibile con il diritto europeo solo se giustificato da obiettivi legittimi e proporzionato. Hanno però affermato con chiarezza che il diritto dell’Unione osta a una normativa che impedisca al giudice nazionale di annullare una sanzione disciplinare illegittima.

Secondo l’Avvocato Generale, se il TAR Lazio è l’unico organo dotato dei requisiti di indipendenza richiesti dall’art. 47 della Carta, esso deve poter esercitare un sindacato pieno, comprensivo del potere di annullamento e di sospensione cautelare. La verifica di tale presupposto è rimessa allo stesso TAR, ma la Nota osserva come difficilmente gli organi di giustizia sportiva possano essere qualificati come “giurisdizioni” europee, essendo i loro componenti nominati dalle stesse federazioni soggette al loro giudizio.

Verso una riforma necessaria

La decisione della Corte di Giustizia potrebbe determinare l’incompatibilità della legge n. 280/2003 con il diritto dell’Unione, imponendo al giudice amministrativo di disapplicare la normativa interna e di esercitare un controllo pieno sulle sanzioni disciplinari. Le conseguenze sarebbero rilevanti sia per i singoli procedimenti, come quello che coinvolge Agnelli e Arrivabene, sia per l’assetto complessivo della giustizia sportiva italiana.

Il Governo ha già avviato un tavolo di lavoro con CONI e CIP per una riforma organica del sistema. La Nota evidenzia come tale riforma non possa limitarsi a riconoscere al TAR Lazio poteri più ampi, ma debba necessariamente intervenire sulla struttura interna delle federazioni, riducendo i gradi di giudizio, rafforzando l’indipendenza degli organi e codificando garanzie procedurali minime uniformi. Solo un intervento complessivo potrà assicurare un equilibrio tra autonomia sportiva, effettività della tutela giurisdizionale e conformità ai principi europei.

Sport Desk Legal & Tax di GA‑Alliance

GA‑Alliance ha costituito il primo team integrato Legal & Tax dedicato allo Sport con coverage nazionale e internazionale, guidato dal professor Enrico Lubrano ed Ezio Simonelli. Lo Sport Desk riunisce competenze di eccellenza nel diritto sportivo, amministrativo e fiscale, grazie a una squadra multidisciplinare composta, in Italia, dal Prof. Lubrano, dal Dott. Simonelli (presidente della Lega Calcio di Serie A), dai partner Cristiano Cerchiai (presidente della Federazione Italiana Golf), Laura Bellicini (già membro del collegio sindacale FIG), e dal Counsel Vincenzo Volpe (Procura Federale FIGC). A livello internazionale, il Desk si avvale dell’esperienza dei partner Bahaa Alieldean (Egitto), Joao Valadas Coriel (Portogallo), Stevan Dimitrijević (Bosnia‑Herzegovina) e Panagiotis Drakopoulos (Grecia & Cipro), garantendo una piattaforma transfrontaliera coordinata e unica nel mercato.

La Practice globale “Sport Legal & Tax” offre assistenza completa lungo l’intero ciclo di vita dell’attività sportiva: diritto sportivo, regolamentazione e disciplina nazionale e internazionale, sponsorizzazioni, licensing, accordi commerciali, diritti media e digitali, nonché supporto su progetti infrastrutturali e sviluppo di stadi tramite modelli di partenariato pubblico‑privato. Il Desk segue inoltre la strutturazione fiscale e la pianificazione cross‑border per club, atleti e investitori, e gestisce contenziosi sportivi e arbitrati, assicurando sempre la massima compliance ai parametri di sostenibilità finanziaria e vigilanza regolamentare. Una piattaforma integrata pensata per accompagnare l’evoluzione dell’industria dello sport in Italia e all’estero.

Scarica la Nota completa

Per approfondire nel dettaglio il quadro normativo, le questioni pregiudiziali e le prospettive di riforma, è possibile scaricare la Nota integrale redatta da GA‑Alliance.Il documento offre un’analisi completa e aggiornata, utile per professionisti, operatori del settore e studiosi interessati all’evoluzione della giustizia sportiva italiana nel contesto europeo.

Scarica la Nota completa

NOTA_Giustizia_Sportiva_17.04.2026 GA-Alliance Sport DeskDownload

L’attuale scenario economico non concede più spazio a visioni frammentate. Per l’imprenditore di oggi, la protezione e la sostenibilità del patrimonio sono sfide che superano i confini delle singole competenze tecniche. È da questa consapevolezza che in GA-Alliance abbiamo organizzato il workshop “Banker e Professionista: la nuova consulenza strategica”, un incontro nato per dimostrare come solo un modello di one-stop shop multidisciplinare, con proiezione nazionale e internazionale, possa offrire risposte concrete a problemi complessi.

Il nostro obiettivo è chiaro: porre GA-Alliance come l’Hub professionale ideale per affiancare i Banker nella gestione dei loro clienti più sofisticati. Siamo convinti che l’integrazione tra la visione finanziaria del Banker e la nostra piattaforma legale e fiscale permetta di far emergere e valorizzare i patrimoni aziendali, trasformando ogni criticità legata agli assetti proprietari in un’opportunità di crescita. In questa sinergia, il Banker non è solo un fornitore di servizi, ma il perno di un ecosistema che garantisce al cliente una tutela globale.

Un ringraziamento particolare va ai relatori che hanno tradotto questa visione in percorsi operativi. Francesco Sciaudone, Managing Partner di GA-Alliance, ha tracciato la rotta verso un approccio alla consulenza che non conosce confini specialistici e geografici. Gianluca Santilli, Of Counsel di GA-Alliance, ha approfondito le soluzioni più efficaci per governare le delicate dinamiche dei passaggi generazionali, mentre Barbara Cortese, esperta di Wealth Management, ha analizzato le evoluzioni necessarie in materia di governance e fiscalità alla luce delle sfide odierne. Ringraziamo anche Andrea Martina, Partner di GA-Alliance, per il suo intervento sui temi Banking & Finance seguiti dallo studio. 

Siamo convinti che definire un nuovo standard di assistenza passi necessariamente attraverso questa capacità di operare in simbiosi. Grazie ai professionisti e ai Banker che hanno partecipato: insieme stiamo costruendo una piattaforma dove l'esperienza multidisciplinare diventa il principale strumento di protezione per l'impresa e di valore per chi la assiste.

 

Sentenza della Corte di giustizia nella causa C-588/24, Imballaggi Piemontesi S.r.l. contro Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)

Con sentenza pubblicata in data 15 gennaio 2026, la Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione europea si è pronunciata sul rinvio pregiudiziale proposto dal Consiglio di Stato con ordinanza del 26 agosto 2024,  con cui è stata sottoposta alla Corte di Giustizia la seguente questione pregiudiziale: «Se gli articoli 41 e 47 [della Carta] e l’articolo [6] CEDU ostino ad una disciplina quale quella nazionale che, in materia di vigilanza su intese restrittive della libertà di concorrenza, ai fini dell’esercizio dei poteri sanzionatori e fermo restando l’esercizio dei poteri conformativi, non prevede espressamente la natura perentoria del termine di conclusione del procedimento fissato dall’[AGCM] con la comunicazione di contestazione degli addebiti, consentendo all’Autorità di prorogare unilateralmente il detto temine di conclusione, con atti di proroga motivati, al sopravvenire di circostanze che determinano un ampliamento oggettivo o soggettivo dell’accertamento».

La domanda è stata sollevata nell’ambito di una controversia tra la società Imballaggi Piemontesi S.r.l. (“Imballaggi Piemontesi”) e l’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato(“AGCM”), relativamente alle sanzioni irrogate alla società per la partecipazione al cartello del cartone ondulato. In particolare, con delibera del 22 marzo 2017, l’AGCM ha avviato il procedimento istruttorio ai sensi dell’articolo 14 della legge n. 287/90, fissando il termine di conclusione al 31 maggio 2018. Nel corso dell’istruttoria, l’Autorità ha esteso il procedimento sia dal punto di vista soggettivo, coinvolgendo altre società, sia dal punto di vista oggettivo, includendo nuove condotte, differendo conseguentemente il termine per la conclusione del procedimento istruttorio prima al 31 dicembre 2018 e poi per la seconda volta al 19 luglio 2019. Con provvedimento n. 27849 del 17 luglio 2019, l’Autorità ha accertato la partecipazione di Imballaggi Piemontesi a un’intesa restrittiva della concorrenza nel mercato della produzione e commercializzazione di fogli in cartone ondulato (c.d. “intesa fogli”), irrogando una sanzione di € 6.147.746. Il T.A.R. Lazio ha respinto il ricorso proposto dalla società, mentre il Consiglio di Stato ha accolto l’appello limitatamente alla determinazione della sanzione. Imballaggi Piemontesi ha proposto un ricorso per revocazione avverso tale decisione, eccependo la tardività del provvedimento sanzionatorio per violazione del termine di conclusione del procedimento istruttorio, contestando la qualificazione del termine come meramente ordinatorio e non perentorio, e chiedendo al Consiglio di Stato di sollevare una questione pregiudiziale davanti alla Corte di giustizia relativamente alla natura perentoria del termine di conclusione del procedimento istruttorio fissato dall’AGCM nell’atto di avvio del procedimento ai sensi dell’art. 6, comma 3, del d.P.R. n. 217 del 1998. 

Con la sentenza in commento, la Corte di giustizia ha confermato che “le autorità nazionali garanti della concorrenza, qualora ciò risulti necessario per essere in grado di irrogare sanzioni effettive e dissuasive per infrazioni al diritto della concorrenza dell’Unione, devono poter differire il termine di conclusione della fase istruttoria di detta procedura”[1]. In particolare, con riferimento alla possibilità di differire il termine di conclusione della fase istruttoria fissato dall’autorità nazionale nella comunicazione degli addebiti, la Corte ha ribadito che le autorità nazionali garanti della concorrenza devono poter attribuire un diverso grado di priorità alle denunce loro sottoposte, disponendo a tal fine di un ampio margine di discrezionalità. Ne consegue che l’autorità può trovarsi costretta a differire il termine di conclusione di una procedura d’infrazione, anche al fine di dare priorità ad altri procedimenti. A ciò si aggiunge anche che, spesso, i casi in materia di diritto della concorrenza dell’Unione richiedono una complessa analisi materiale ed economica ed è altamente probabile che un’autorità nazionale si veda costretta ad adottare numerosi atti e misure istruttorie, che inevitabilmente prolungano la durata della procedura d’infrazione. Secondo la Corte, poi, un divieto assoluto di differire il termine di conclusione della fase istruttoria di una procedura d’infrazione potrebbe ostacolare l’irrogazione di sanzioni effettive e dissuasive per infrazioni del diritto dell’Unione in materia di concorrenza, rendendo l’applicazione delle relative norme praticamente impossibile o eccessivamente difficile, in violazione del principio di effettività. La Corte ha, pertanto, confermato la possibilità per le autorità nazionali garanti della concorrenza di differire il termine di conclusione della fase istruttoria quando ciò risulti necessario ai fini dell’irrogazione delle sanzioni. 

Tale differimento non può, tuttavia, comportare il superamento di un termine ragionevole entro il quale la procedura deve essere conclusa, da valutare alla luce delle circostanze di ciascun caso, della complessità del procedimento, del comportamento delle parti ecc. La Corte ha precisato che un eventuale differimento: 

deve essere debitamente motivato dall’autorità nazionale; deve essere comunicato il prima possibile all’impresa interessata;      deve essere assoggettabile ad un controllo giurisdizionale. 

La Corte ha, infine, ricordato che un’eventuale violazione del principio del rispetto del termine ragionevole può giustificare l’annullamento di una decisione soltanto qualora comporti una lesione dei diritti della difesa dell’impresa interessata. Come già affermato dal Consiglio di Stato, nel presente caso la società Imballaggi Piemontesi non ha dimostrato che il differimento del termine di conclusione del procedimento istruttorio abbia pregiudicato l’esercizio dei suoi diritti della difesa. 

Alla luce di queste considerazioni, la Corte ha dichiarato che “[l]’articolo 101 TFUE, letto alla luce del principio generale del diritto ad un buon andamento dell’amministrazione, dell’articolo 47 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea nonché del principio di effettività, deve essere interpretato nel senso che: esso non osta a una normativa nazionale che, nell’ambito di un procedimento diretto all’accertamento di una pratica anticoncorrenziale condotto da un’autorità nazionale garante della concorrenza, non prevede espressamente che il termine di conclusione della fase istruttoria del procedimento in parola, fissato da tale autorità nella comunicazione degli addebiti, abbia natura perentoria, cosicché detta autorità può differire unilateralmente tale termine, con atti motivati sottoposti a controllo giurisdizionale, al sopravvenire di circostanze che determinino un ampliamento dell’oggetto di detto procedimento o del numero delle imprese in esso coinvolte, a condizione che un siffatto differimento non abbia come conseguenza un superamento del termine ragionevole entro il quale tale fase istruttoria deve essere conclusa”.

[1] Sentenza C-588/24, par. 62. 

Oltre il credito tradizionale: il mercato dei capitali per le PMI

19 febbraio alle ore 9:30Via Pinciana, 25, Roma  REGISTRATI ALL'EVENTO

Nel contesto economico attuale, la competitività delle imprese laziali si gioca sulla capacità di evolvere le proprie strategie di approvvigionamento finanziario. Per troppo tempo il tessuto produttivo regionale ha fatto affidamento quasi esclusivo sul canale bancario, ma oggi lo scenario richiede un cambio di paradigma fondamentale. Per un’azienda che vuole crescere accedere al mercato dei capitali non è solo un’opportunità ma una necessità strategica per chiunque desideri diversificare le proprie fonti di finanziamento.

L’obiettivo dell’incontro è illustrare come lo strumento dei Basket Bond, che vede nella Regione Lazio un attore centrale e garante a supporto delle eccellenze locali, permetta alle aziende del territorio di superare il modello di funding "bancocentrico", riducendo la vulnerabilità legata alle fluttuazioni del credito ordinario e aprendosi a investitori istituzionali. Attraverso questa forma di finanza strutturata, le imprese possono acquisire una maggiore autonomia finanziaria e una maggiore solidità reputazionale, posizionandosi con autorevolezza sui mercati internazionali.

È il momento di trasformare la finanza da semplice strumento di supporto a vero e proprio motore di innovazione, sfruttando le sinergie regionali per costruire una struttura di capitale moderna, resiliente e indipendente.

TAVOLA ROTONDA Francesco Sciaudone, Managing Partner, GA-Alliance Roberta Angelilli, Vicepresidente, Assessore Sviluppo economico, Commercio, Artigianato, Industria, Internazionalizzazione, Regione Lazio Giulio Bastia, Condirettore Generale, Banca Finnat Euramerica Giuseppe Biazzo, Presidente, Unindustria Angelo Camilli, Vice Presidente per il Credito la Finanza e il Fisco, Confindustria Vincenzo P. Carbonara, Head of Alternative Finance, CDP Toni Ciolfi, Consigliere, Ordine dei commercialisti di Roma Vincenzo P. Carbonara, Head of Alternative Finance, CDP Lorenzo Coletta, Head of Minibond and Basket Bond, MCC Massimo Fabiano, Head of Business Development Corporate Debt, Banca Finint Andrea Martina, Partner, GA-Alliance Paola Sepe, Counsel, GA-Alliance Dettagli dell’evento

Data: 19 febbraio 2026Orario:

9:30 Registrazione e Welcome Coffee 10:00 Inizio Lavori 12:30 Conclusione e Networking Lunch

Luogo: Sede GA-Alliance, Via Pinciana, 25, Roma

RSVP | Compila il form e registrati all’evento

RSVP | Compila il form e registrati all’evento

Basket Bond Regione Lazio

Basket Bond v5Download

GA‑Alliance Shares Key Takeaways on the EU–Mercosur Agreement3 February 2026

GA‑Alliance – Global Legal and Tax Advisors presents the latest developments on the EU–Mercosur Agreement following its international webinar “The EU–Mercosur Agreement and the Future of Transatlantic Business”, held on 22 January 2026. The discussion brought together experts from Europe and Latin America to assess the agreement’s practical impact on companies, trade flows, and regulatory frameworks across both regions.

Signed on 17 January 2026, the EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement introduces wide‑ranging commitments, from significant tariff reductions to strengthened sustainability, SPS and intellectual‑property provisions, as outlined by GA Alliance. Speakers highlighted the geopolitical relevance of the agreement, its potential to diversify EU supply chains, and the opportunities it creates in sectors such as energy, agribusiness, industrial production, and services.

GA‑Alliance continues to monitor the institutional process, including the pending review before the European Court of Justice, and provides integrated guidance to businesses navigating the evolving regulatory landscape.

A detailed briefing with country‑specific insights and legal analysis is available here: click to access the full document.

EU-MERCOSUR AGREEMENT: The future of transatlantic business

GA Brux_ Report EU-Mercosur 03.02.2026Download

Table of Content

Executive Summary State of the Agreement and Institutional Process Strategic relevance of the agreement for the EU Legal, trade and sustainability aspects Country perspective and sectorial implications Conclusions Executive Summary

This document provides an update on the status of the EU–Mercosur Association Agreement following the seminar organized by GA-Alliance – Global Legal and Tax Advisors together with its partners in South America, held during the webinar on 22 January 2026 entitled “The EU–Mercosur Agreement and the Future of Transatlantic Business.”

The webinar event brought together GA Alliance professionals from Europe and Latin America, confirming the Alliance’s role as an international platform capable of connecting the two continents and offering an integrated analysis of the main developments in international trade, regulation, and tax strategy. The panel — made up of experts from Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Colombia — discussed the practical significance of the agreement for European and Latin American businesses, examining commercial, regulatory, and operational implications.

The webinar also highlighted that the agreement, politically concluded after more than 25 years of negotiations, represents far more than a tariff deal: it introduces new sustainability standards, rules on intellectual property, procurement opportunities, and a regulatory framework that will reshape the economic axis between the EU and Mercosur. The gradual elimination of over 90% of customs duties could generate significant benefits for European and Italian exports, estimated at more than €14 billion.

GA Alliance, leveraging its global presence in over 80 countries and a multidisciplinary team of more than 2,600 professionals, continues to monitor developments in the agreement, offering an integrated perspective on the impacts for economic operators and investors, and translating a complex debate into concrete guidance for international stakeholders.

State of the Agreement and Institutional Process

The EU-Mercosur negotiation process began in 2000, following earlier exploratory dialogues and cooperation frameworks dating back to the 1990s. After years of intermittent negotiations, the parties reached a political agreement on 6 December 2024 on a comprehensive Partnership Agreement (EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement, or “EMPA”), covering trade, political dialogue, cooperation and sustainable development.

Subsequently, on 3 September 2025, the European Commission adopted proposals for the Council to authorise the signature and conclusion of two parallel legal instruments: the EMPA and an Interim Trade Agreement (“iTA”), designed to allow trade commitments to be applied ahead of the full EMPA’s entry into force.

On 9 January 2026, the Council of the European Union formally adopted the decisions authorising the signature of both the EMPA and the iTA.

The agreements were signed on 17 January 2026 by representatives of the EU and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) in Asunción, Paraguay.

At this stage, the EMPA and the iTA are concluded instruments. However, their entry into force depends on further procedures: the EMPA must be ratified by all EU Member States and Mercosur legislatures, while the iTA will enter into force once the European Parliament gives its consent and the Council concludes it.

Currently, EU ratification of the agreement is suspended pending review by the European Court of Justice following a referral by the European Parliament in January 2026 over questions related to legal competence, the precautionary principle, and the structure of the agreement, a process that may take up to approximately 18-24 months.

Strategic relevance of the agreement for the EU

From the perspective emerging during the seminar, the EU-Mercosur Agreement was presented as a legal, political and institutional instrument with clear geopolitical relevance, capable of reshaping long-term economic leadership through rule-based cooperation.

Beyond trade liberalisation, the agreement was framed as a tool to reinforce the EU’s strategic presence in South America at a time of mounting global fragmentation and intensified competition from China. In an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, the EU must diversify not only its export markets but also its sources of imports, while establishing solid contractual ties with reliable partners.

The Mercosur region comprises approximately 300 million inhabitants and represents a major trading area. The EU is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, while Mercosur is the EU’s tenth-largest trading partner. Historically, the EU remains the largest investor in the region, with European companies operating in Brazil and Argentina for over a century. In 2024, the EU accounted for 16.8% of Mercosur’s total trade. EU exports to Mercosur amounted to €53.3 billion, while Mercosur exports to the EU totalled €57 billion.

Mercosur’s main exports to the EU consisted primarily of agricultural products (42.7%), mineral products (30.5%), and pulp and paper (6.8%), whereas EU exports were dominated by machinery (28.1%), chemicals and pharmaceuticals (25%), and transport equipment (12.1%). In the services sector, in 2023 the EU exported €28.5 billion to Mercosur, while Mercosur exported €13.1 billion to the EU.

The agreement is structured around four main pillars (trade, investment, sustainability and cooperation) and is expected to generate estimated tariff savings of around USD 4 billion per year. The schedule of commitments reflects an asymmetric and gradual approach, with Mercosur granted up to 15 years to dismantle tariffs on around 90% of imports, while the EU would liberalise approximately 93% of imports from Mercosur within 10 years.

Over the long term, the agreement is expected to support industrial production, facilitate access to capital goods, enable accumulation of origin between the two blocs and foster intra-bloc trade, with positive GDP effects projected towards 2040.

Legal, trade and sustainability aspects

Food safety and sanitary and phytosanitary (“SPS”) controls are integrated into the agreement’s operational framework.

The EU already imports beef and other products from Mercosur countries, and the agreement maintains existing EU sanitary legislation while intensifying border checks. Only authorised slaughterhouses may export to the EU, subject to 100% documentary controls, supported by a rapid alert system among Member States and bilateral safeguard clauses to prevent sudden import surges or price collapses. The EU has also doubled available crisis funds for the agricultural sector.

Legal certainty is reinforced through references to the precautionary principle and WTO-aligned SPS measures, while the rebalancing mechanism (modeled on GATT framework) provides a structured dispute resolution pathway, allowing a party to request compensation if measures nullify expected benefits. These mechanisms underpin both predictability and enforceability, contributing to the robustness of the agreement.

Sustainability commitments are central, including legally binding obligations to halt deforestation and align with the Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals, and Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests. The agreement also provides a platform for dialogue on the EU Deforestation Regulation and wider environmental initiatives.

Country perspective and sectorial implications

While the EU-Mercosur agreement sets a common framework, its economic and regulatory impact varies significantly across the member countries, reflecting differences in population size, industrial structure, and trade policies. Understanding these national perspectives is essential to grasp the practical implications of the agreement and the opportunities it creates for trade, investment, and sustainability initiatives.

Paraguay benefits from extensive differentiated treatment designed to bolster its domestic processing and service sectors. The agreement grants an exclusive 10,000-tonne quota for organic sugar at a zero-percent tariff, alongside preferential 5% duties for critical auto part designations. To ensure stability, the framework provides extended timelines for trade defense and sanitary measures, including a two-year extension of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (“SGP”) conditions for key exports like corn and yerba mate. By preserving national policy space for public procurement and amplifying service exclusions, the agreement facilitates integrated value chains in biofuels, honey, and oilseeds while fostering a robust market for sustainability certification services.

Argentina is positioned as a relevant dual energy partner for Europe, offering immediate and long-term solutions to the continent’s energy needs. In the short term, the country is set to supply natural gas and LNG from the Vaca Muerta formation under stable, long-term contractual arrangements. Looking ahead, the focus shifts to the renewable energy sector and green hydrogen, underpinned by the extraction of critical minerals such as lithium and copper. These initiatives are closely aligned with Europe’s decarbonisation agenda and are supported by the “Global Gateway” initiative. This framework facilitates technology transfer and attracts European investment into projects that strictly adhere to Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) standards.

Brazil, with over 210 million inhabitants, represents most of the Mercosur’s population and a leading global agricultural exporter. The agreement is broadly compatible with existing practices among large companies already aligned with EU standards, though smaller firms may need to adjust. Key improvements include the simplification and digitalisation of customs procedures, the mutual recognition of certifications, and a potential reduction of the “custo Brasil.” by mitigating the structural and bureaucratic burdens that historically inflate the cost of operations in the country. Additionally, the agreement fosters enhanced competitiveness through interactions with the current VAT reform. The analysis also covered consumer prices and investment decisions across sectors such as machinery, vehicles, fertilisers, and food and beverages.

Conclusions

GA-Alliance’s seminar showcased the value of practitioner-led, cross-regional analysis in breaking down the legal and economic complexities of the EU-Mercosur agreement. By providing a bridge between policy and practice, the discussion translated high-level trade objectives into concrete opportunities for the private and public sectors.

The EU-Mercosur agreement constitutes a strategically significant instrument to reinforce the EU’s global competitiveness, diversify trade and supply chains, and secure access to critical resources and energy supplies. The agreement establishes robust legal, trade and sustainability mechanisms, including precautionary and SPS measures, rebalancing provisions, and enforceable climate and deforestation commitments. Differentiated treatment for specific Mercosur countries, combined with sectoral and investment provisions, supports agribusiness, energy transition, industrial production, and integrated value chains across the region. The agreement offers measurable long-term economic benefits, including tariff reductions, market access, investment opportunities, and enhanced cooperation on environmental and sustainability objectives.

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3 February 2026

Bruxelles

Cross Border Investment in Latin America